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Abstract: The time has come, given the relative maturity of the jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union, regarding the peculiarities linked to the protection of fundamental rights in 
EU system of civil judicial cooperation to dedicate a detailed investigation and in the field of incidence 
of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on EU’s legal system, as well as the specific modalities that affects 
the elaboration and application of the instruments of civil judicial co-operation.
Keywords: CFREU, European Union integration, private international law, civil judicial coopera-
tion, protection of fundamental rights.
Resumen: Ha llegado el momento, dada la relativa madurez de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de 
Justicia de la Unión Europea, en relación con las peculiaridades relacionadas con la protección de los 
derechos fundamentales en el sistema de cooperación judicial civil de la UE para dedicar una investiga-
ción detallada y en el campo de la incidencia. de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE sobre 
el sistema legal de la UE, así como las modalidades específicas que afectan la elaboración y aplicación 
de los instrumentos de cooperación judicial civil.
Palabras clave: CFREU, integración de la Unión Europea, derecho internacional privado, coope-
ración judicial civil, protección de los derechos fundamentales.
Summary: I.Introduction; II.Weighting between conflicting rights; III.CFREU as a para-
meter of validity in EU law; IV.Civil judicial cooperation and the principle of mutual recognition; 
V.Civil judicial cooperation and values inherent to protection of fundamental rights; VI.The scope of
application of CFREU in the system of civil judicial cooperation; VII.Weighting between rights as
a general interpretative criterion in civil judicial cooperation; VIII.Interpretation of EU and national
rules in accordance with CFREU on civil judicial cooperation; IX.Use of CFREU rules for the inter-
pretation of general concepts of private international law; X.Impact of CFREU on the identification
of jurisdiction titles and connection criteria; XI.Concluding remarks.
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I. Introduction
1. EU civil judicial cooperation is declined within a highly fragmented system with frequent 
adoption of instruments dedicated simultaneously to the recognition of decisions and jurisdiction, but 
also to the designation of applicable law1. The development of more and more advanced systems in 
terms of integration of national legal systems has been encouraged, as demonstrated by the abolition of 
exequatur2, which has only recently taken place in some areas3: the creation of a European enforcement 
order, the trend to remove any space left to titles of jurisdiction of state origin and the institution a cer-
tificate of European succession4.
2. With the now acquired awareness of expansive effectiveness of above all regional interna-
tional norms in the field of human rights and to private international law and procedure matters whose 
objectives and methods have long overcome the traditional connotation of neutrality, may be largely 
conditioned by the need to build certain material results, which the state, without prejudice to the right 
to choose the most appropriate means for this purpose, has the international obligation to guarantee 
individuals.
3. The growing importance of coordination between requirements underlying the protection of 
human rights and specific aims of various areas of private international law and procedure is also wor-
thy of note. Much less attention has, however, been reserved until now to the systematic impact of the 
Charter for the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) as a primary source within EU on 
judicial cooperation in civil matters5.
4. A survey related to this profile appears particularly necessary. Different are the same instru-
ments adopted by the Union in this area and this before were clearly defined in EU’s legal system6, as it 
results from the explicit mention of specific provisions in the preamble or in the text of Union’s single 
acts. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) again is protagonist to the interpretation of 
these instruments. References to single CFREU dispositions appear even on direct solicitation of natio-
1  The present paper is updated until February 2019. D. LiakopouLos, Recognition and enforcement of foreign sentences in 
European Union context: The italian and german private international law cases, in International and European Union Legal 
Matters-working paper series, 2010.
2  r.m. moura ramos, Estudos de direito internacional privado da União Europeia, Coimbra University Press, Coimbra, 
2016.
3  D. scramm, Enforcement and the abolition of exequatur under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, in Yearbook of Private 
International Law, 2013/2014, pp. 144ss. R.M. moura ramos, Estudos de direito internacional privado da União Europeia, 
Coimbra University Press, Coimbra, 2016.
4  For further details see: G. paLao moreno, G., aLonDo LanDeta, I., buìges, (dirs.), Sucesiones internacionales. Comentarios 
al Reglamento (UE) 650/2012, Marcial Pons, Valencia, 2015, pp. 58ss.
5  C. monereo atienza, J.L. monereo pèrez, La Europa de los derechos. Estudio sistemàtico de la Carta de los derechos 
fundamentales de la Uniòn Europea, ed. Comares, Granada, 2012.
6  According to the recital n. 33 of the Regulation n. 2201/2003. Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 
2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of paren-
tal responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. A proposal for a revised Regulation was adopted by the European 
Commission on June 30, 2016. Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), COM(2016) 411 
final. See from the CJEU, C-404/14 Matoukovà of 6 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:653, published in the electronic Re-
ports of the cases. See in argument: M. storme, Harmonisation of civil procedure and the interaction with substantive private 
law, in X.E. kramer, C.H. van rhee, Civil litigation in a globalizing World, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2012, pp. 142ss. 
W. van baLLegooi, The nature of mutual recognition in European law, ed. Intersentia, Antwerp & Oxford, 2015. C.M. Caamiňa 
Domìnguez, La “supresiòn” del exequàtur en el R 2201/2003, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 3, 2011, pp. 66ss. G. 
cuniberti, Abolition de l’exequatur et présomption de protection des droits fondamentaux, in Revue Critique de Droit Interna-
tional Privè, 103 (1), 2014, pp. 304ss. T. pfeiffer, The abolition of exequatur and the free circulation of judgments, in F. ferrari, 
F. ragno (eds), Cross-border litigation in Europe: the Brussels I Recast Regulation as a panacea?, ed. Wolters Kluwer/Cedam, 
The Hague, 2016, pp. 188ss. M. thöne, Die Abschaffung des Exequaturverfahrens und die EuGVVO. Veröffentlichungen zum 
Verfahrensrecht, ed. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2016. A. hameD, K. tatsiana, A step forward in the harmonization of European 
jurisdiction: Regulation Brussels I Recast, in Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 9, 2016, pp. 162ss.
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nal judgments in an ever less sporadic way. This phenomenon intersects with the consequences that the 
application of the same CFREU before the national court is intended to produce and to the presence of 
different categories of provisions inside to its text.
5. CFREU can determine a particularly significant impact with respect to the implementation of 
acts pursuant to art. 81 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)7, in as much as it takes pla-
ce, by virtue of the instruments of private and procedural international law, according to peculiar mecha-
nisms therefore different from those found in other Union policies. This follows from the fact that these 
acts regulate only certain aspects of civil procedure, while most procedural aspects8 and the application of 
laws referred to conflict rules, even in the context of transnational disputes, remain under the responsibi-
lity of member states and certain efforts of the Union legislator towards the harmonization of procedural9 
or material rules. It is difficult to clearly delineate a line of demarcation between the profiles of protection 
of fundamental rights and those of internal importance before considering CFREU’s impact and limits.
II. Weighting between conflicting rights
1. A situation of potential contrast between subjective positions can arise in multiple contexts, 
whenever the values pursued by the individual provisions cannot be simultaneously realized in their en-
tirety, but constitute reciprocal limits to their respective exercise and therefore to their protection. At the 
same time, it must be borne in mind that the possible competition between several fundamental rights 
guaranteed by CJEU is likely to be examined whatever the purpose for which these rights are invoked. 
7  For further details and analysis see: A. hartkamp, C. siburg, W. Devroe, Cases, materials and text on European Union law 
and private law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017, pp. 282ss. K. Lenaerts, I. maseLis, K. gutman, European 
Union procedural law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 133ss. M. wiezbowski, A. gubrynowicz, International invest-
ment law for the 21st century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. A.H. türk, Judicial review in European Union law, Edward 
Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2010. L. wooDs, P. watson, Steiner & Woods European Union law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2017, pp. 37ss C. barnarD, S. peers, European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 788ss. E. berry, 
M.Y. homewooD, B. bogusz, Complete European Union law. Texts, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 
G. conway, European Union law, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2015. F. nicoLa, B. Davies, European Union law stories, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. J. usherwooD, S. ppinDer, The European Union. A very short introduction, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2018. J.L. Da cruz viLaÇa, European Union law and integration. Twenty years of judicial appli-
cation of European Union law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014. T.H. foLsom, Principles of European Union 
law, including Brexit, West Academic, Minnesota, 2017, pp. 278ss. R. geiger, D.E. khan, M. kotzur, EUV/AEUV, C.H. Beck, 
München, 2016. M. Decheva, Recht der europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018. C. barnarD, S. peers, European 
Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 586ss. N. foster, European Union law directions, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2016. A. thies, International trade disputes and European Union liability, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2013.
8  D. LiakopouLos, The influence of EU law on national civil procedural law: Towards the adoption of common minimum 
standards?-La influencia de la legislaciòn de la UE en el derecho procesal civil nacional: ¿hacia la adopciòn de normas min-
imas comunes?, in Revista General de Derecho Europeo, 46, 2018
9  A further element of specialty is constituted by the tendentially “horizontal structure of the process” as we have noted 
through the case Povse v. Alpago (C-211/10 PPU, Povse of 1st July 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400, I-06673) on the execution of a 
provision ordering the return of a child subject to international subtraction pursuant to art. 11, par. 8 of Regulation n. 2201/2003 
was closed with two appeals brought by both parties to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for antithetical vio-
lations of art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) da parte dell’Austria (ECtHR, Povse v. Austria of 18 
June 2013 and M.A. v. Austria v. Austria of 15 January 2015). For further details see: V. Lazić, Family private international 
law issues before the European Court of Human Rights. Lessons to be learned from Povse v. Austria in revising the Brussels 
II Regulation, in C. pauLussen, T. tukàcs, B. van rompuy, Fundamental rights in international and European law, T.M.C. 
Asser Press & Springer, Berlin, 2016, pp. 162ss. M. hazeLhorst, The ECtHR’s decision in Povse: Guidance for the future of 
the abolition of exequatur from civil judgments in the European Union, in Nederlands International Privatrechts-NIPR, 2014, 
pp. 28ss. With the aforementioned cases we can understand that a certain “obstacle”/impediment with respect to civil judicial 
cooperation is presented towards a form of declination of an approach to fundamental rights according to the traditional scheme 
linked to the state-in-individual relationship. The application of the rules of international private and procedural law of the 
European Union is likely to deny competition between opposing fundamental rights and therefore to impose the use of an eval-
uation parameter based on the weighting of the values. In the same spirit see also: T. LiefaarD, J. sLoth-nieLsen, The United 
Nations Convention on the rights of the child, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2016, pp. 228ss. X.E. kramer, Cross border enforcement 
and the Brussels I-bis Regulation. Towards a new balance between mutual trust and national control over fundamental rights, 
in Netherlands International Law Review, 60 (3), 2013, pp. 346ss.
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2. In the jurisprudence of CJEU, situations have long emerged with respect to which competition 
between fundamental rights can arise and therefore the joint consideration of the same is required. Such 
a scenario has been examined several times with reference to the protection of personal data and privacy. 
Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in the Promusicae of 29 January 200810 CJEU ruling 
noted that the rights of which the association of producers and publishers solicited respect and precisely 
copyright (brought back by CJEU to guarantee the right of property) and the right to an effective judi-
cial review, were protected by CFREU. But on the other hand, he underlined the fact that they had to be 
coordinated with the right to respect private life. Reaffirming a solution already proposed by its previous 
jurisprudence regarding the circulation of personal data211, CJEU emphasized the need to identify a “right 
balance”12 between the opposing rights and specified that it must be based on the interpretation of relevant 
EU act and national transposing legislation, as well as guaranteed by member state authorities. This ap-
proach implies not only timely constraints in relation to the interpretation of European and state discipline 
that comes from time to time, excluding its compatibility with CFREU when it is not inspired in the abs-
tract, to the criterion of “right balance”; but above all it requires an examination of individual’s concrete 
case, in order to assess whether the reconciliation between various fundamental rights can be achieved.
3. The same solution was repeated in similar cases13 in which it was necessary to reconcile the 
guarantee of intellectual property rights (and possibly of the right to effective judicial protection) with 
different categories of rights, which include the right to privacy, freedom of enterprise and the right to 
communicate and receive information14. In such cases the criterion of “fair balance” was understood as 
not being compatible with the necessity of protection of fundamental rights national provisions15 which 
establish suitable measures to unconditionally privilege one of the fundamental rights in competition 
with each other, while acceptable to impose restrictions on a right in order to guarantee the other16.
4. It is apparent from this case-law that a particularly relevant element for assessing the existen-
ce of a fair balance is the fact that EU legislature has taken into account this need to reconcile the various 
fundamental rights by adopting provisions intended for that purpose.
5. This solution appears to be consistent with the provisions of art. 52, par. 1 CFREU17 which ad-
mits limitations of fundamental rights when “they effectively meet (...) the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others”18. The criterion of “fair balance” seems to constitute a general model to ensure the co-
10  CJEU, C-275/06, Promusicae of 29 January 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, I-00271.
11  According the sentence from the CJEU: C-101/01, Lindqvist of 6 November 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, I-12971.
12  D. sušnJar, Proportionality, fundamental rights and balance of powers, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2010
13  CJEU, C-484/14, McFadden of 15 September 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689; C-160/15, GS Media of 8 September 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, C-580/13, Coty Germany of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:485, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien of 27 
March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192; C-461/10, Bonnier Audio and others of 19 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:219; C-360/10, 
Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs of 16 February 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, all the above cited cases was published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. See also: C-70/10, Scarlet Extended of 24 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, I-11059. For 
further details see: O.A. rongstaD, Property aspects of intellectual property, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018.
14  V. kosta, Fundamental rights in EU internal market legislation, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 
92ss.
15  CJEU, C-468/10, ASNEF and FECEMD of 24 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:777, I-12181.
16  The situation appears different in the judgment of the CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems of 6 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases, in which no conflicting rights were discussed but the right to privacy was 
compressed to facing public security needs. In the sense that in such a case, the very essence of the right being in any case, 
there could not be any space for a balance. For further details see: T. oJanen, Making the essence of fundamental rights real. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter, in European Con-
stitutional Law Review, 12, 2016, pp. 220ss. S. greer, J. gerarDs, R. sLowe, Human rights in the Council of Europe and the 
European Union. Achievement, trends and challenges, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 328ss. J. wouters, 
C. rryngaert, T. ruys, International law. A European perspective, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2018.
17  X. groustot, G.T. petursson, The EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights five years on. The emergence of a new con-
stitutional framework?, in S. De vries, U. bernits, S. weatheriLL, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding instru-
ment. Five years old and growing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
18  S. De vries, U. bernits, S. weatheriLL, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding instrument. Five years old 
and growing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
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existence of conflicting rights19 even if it was used by CJEU in an inconsistent manner, sometimes ensuring 
a clear prevalence of one of the competing rights20, especially where this corresponded to one of the impe-
rative requirements to which CJEU had previously referred in its jurisprudence on freedom of movement21.
11. A different solution could be prefigured in hypothesis, in which the importance of one of the 
subjective positions involved is such as not to tolerate exceptions or restrictions as belonging to the category 
of rights that have been defined as “absolute”. The very nature of the latter could determine the necessity 
of resorting to a criterion not attributable to the “right balance” even if it seems to be excluded that in the 
matter of protection of fundamental rights a mechanical criterion of prevalence can take place, on the other 
not applicable not even when a right of an absolute nature should be weighted with respect to the needs 
of a public nature22. It is strongly emphasized by CJEU the need to guarantee, obviously through judicial 
19  CJEU, C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands of 4 May 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:325; C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and others of 18 July 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, par. 30ss, above the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. See also: C-324/09, 
L’Orèal and others of 12 July 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, I-06011, par. 143. For further details and analysis see: J. menDes, I. 
wenzke, Allocating authority: Who should do what in European and international law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 
2018. C. twigg-fLesner, Research handbook on EU consumer and contract law, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2016, pp. 
124ss. M. hosovec, Injunctions against intermediaries the European Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
20  As we can see in the case CJEU, C-12/11, McDonagh of 31 January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:43, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of the cases.
21  For further details see: P. oLiver, Free movement of goods in the European Union, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, 
Portland, 2010, pp. 228ss.
22  CJEU, C-578/16, C.K. and others v. Republika Slovenija of 16 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, joined cases 
C-404/15 and C-659/15, P. Aranyosi and R. Căldăraru of 5 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, above the cited cases published 
in the electronic Reports of the cases. In particular the attitude of the Luxembourg courts in relation to the interpretation of the 
principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust in civil procedural matters is intended to align with the “warnings” enucleated 
by the European Court in Avotinš. The reasons behind the less rigorous interpretation of this principle in the aforementioned 
ruling-based on the derivation of a new mandatory reason for non-execution of a European arrest warrant, where such execution 
exposes the person concerned to the actual risk of suffering treatment inhuman or degrading-they can not in fact move perfectly 
within the civil procedural matter, considering the ontological difference of the fundamental rights at stake. The CJEU has gone 
further on the mutual recognition and has been based on another interpretative way stating that the art. 3 of the ECHR and 4 of 
the CFREU must be interpreted: “(...) in a convergence between (...)”. In particular the Advocate General Yves Bot has declared 
that: “(...) In the Advocate General’s search for balance he considers first whether Article 1(3) FDEAW constitutes a ground 
for non-execution of an arrest warrant. He rejects such a notion for the following three reasons. First off, interpreting Article 
1(3) as a non-execution ground would run counter to the phrasing of that Article, which due to its place and wording does not 
express a non-execution ground, but rather the principle of mutual trust. Secondly, such a notion would not be in agreement 
with the EU legislator’s intent to create a system of surrender with exhaustively enumerated non-recognition grounds, whereby, 
in addition to the grounds in Articles 3, 4, and 4a FDEAW, only in the exceptional circumstances described in Recitals (10) 
and (13) surrender can be suspended or removal, expulsion or extradition can be prohibited. Last, a ground of non-recognition 
in Article 1(3) would severely damage mutual trust between judicial authorities on which the Framework Decision is based 
and would, as a result, make the principle of mutual recognition meaningless (...)”. We are also talking about another princi-
ple-value of the Union, that of proportionality as a balancing of interests and the widening of the discretionary sphere of the 
internal judge, and the circumstances in speciem. Criminal cooperation does not seem to be comparable with the similar ground 
and dates back to the experience of the single market, in terms of decisive jurisprudential protagonism. Let us not forget that 
criminal cooperation has been based on the definition of common minimum standards for delineating spaces and limits of 
cooperation between judicial and police authorities in the areas selected by the Member States and by the Union legislator. Of 
course we can speak of a positive and normative unification for years in the criminal sector and especially after the Treaty of 
Lisbon the merit belongs to the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions which continues to guarantee a median 
solution to integration that is summarized in the protection of rights fundamental rights, the inalienable rights of individuals 
and a continuous progress dictated by the Member States towards an increasingly active and proactive contribution, a harbin-
ger of innovations and achievements with the main objective among others the continuous accelerated integration but within a 
harmonious development and development of all the individual interest and not the state one. S. gàspàr-sziLàgy, Joined cases 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging human rights standards, mutual trust and new grounds for postponing a European arrest 
warrant, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 24 (1), 2016, pp. 198ss. K. bbovenD’ eerDt, The 
joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A new limit to the mutual trust presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice?, in Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 32, 2016, pp. 112ss. M. guiresse, Confiance mutuelle et mandat 
d’arrêt européen: Evolution ou inflexion de la Cour de justice?, in GDR-ELSJ, 12 avril 2016. R. nibLock, Mutual recognition, 
mutual trust?: Detention conditions and deferring an EAW, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 24 (2) 2016, pp. 250ss. 
A.E. vervaeLe, Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters to control (transnational) criminality, in N. boister, R.J. currie 
(a cura di), Handbook of transnational criminal law, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2015, pp. 123ss. N. sybesma-knoL, 
The European system for the promotion and protection of human rights, in Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 
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review, an approach aimed at searching the characteristics of individual concrete case for the balance bet-
ween the competing prerogatives of the various subjects protected by the different provisions of CFREU.
III. CFREU as a parameter of validity in EU law
1. The use of interpretation of the rules contained in the acts of EU secondary legislation in ac-
cordance with CFREU may prove insufficient to guarantee compliance with the same as a text belonging 
to primary law. CJEU pre Treaty of Lisbon had abstractly affirmed the possibility of verifying the validi-
ty of acts of the institutions in relation to their compatibility with the principles relating to the protection 
of fundamental rights23, making it clear the consequences that a possible antinomy not resolvable by way 
of interpretation would have determined the declaration of invalidity of the act.
2. This possibility was permissible for any act of institutions and also included those that appro-
ved24 or that would implement international agreements having been clearly stated that “(...) the obli-
gations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of compromising the principles 
of constitutional provisions of EC Treaty, among which is the principle that all Community acts must 
respect fundamental rights (...)”25.
3. By the jurisprudence of CJEU it seems to be possible to derive that following the attribu-
tion to CFREE of the same legal value of the treaties, this model has found a more solid foundation. 
Although CJEU continues to recall together with CFREU also the general principles of law as a source 
on which the need to protect fundamental rights is based, the simultaneous presence of a written source 
has certainly produced certain repercussions26. They concern both the position of national courts, as it 
has made it easier to identify possible parameters of legitimacy of Union acts that refer to fundamental 
Law, 20, 2014. N. foster, European Union law directions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 51ss. D. manseLL, The 
European arrest warrant: The role of Judges when human rights are at risk, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2 (1), 
2011, pp. 133ss. A. tinsLey, Protecting criminal defence rights through EU Law: Opportunities and challenges, in New Journal 
of European Criminal Law, 3 (3), 2013, pp. 461ss. L. wooDs, P. watson, Steiner & Woods European Union law, op. cit., pp. 
37ss. L. achmaier, Mutual recognition instruments and the role of the CJEU: The grounds for non-execution, in New Journal 
of European Criminal Law, 5 (4), 2015, pp. 505ss. E. smith, Running before we can walk? Mutual recognition at the expense 
of fair trials in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Justice and Security, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 3 (1), 2013, pp. 
82ss. S. swoboDa, The self-perception of the European Court of Justice and its neglect of the defense perspective in its prelim-
inary rulings on judicial cooperation in criminal matters: A small note on a fundamental misunderstanding, in Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2015, pp. 361ss. M.P. broberg, N. fenger, Preliminary references to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the right to a fair trial under article 6 ECHR, in European Law Review, 23 (4), 2016, pp. 602ss.
23  CJEU, C-11/70, Handelsgesellschaft of 17 December 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, I-01125. In particular stated that: 
“the fact that they are impaired or the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution of a Member State (...) can not dimin-
ish the validity of a Community measure or its effectiveness in the territory of the same State (...) it is however appropriate 
to ascertain whether it has not been violated no similar guarantee, inherent in Community law (...) the protection of these 
rights, while being informed of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be guaranteed within the 
framework of the structure and the objectives of the Community (...)”. C-274/99, Connoly v. Commission of 6 March 2001, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:127, I-01611, In the same spirit see the opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. For further 
details see: D. LiakopouLos, Interactions between European Court of Human Rights and private international law of European 
Union, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 10 (1), 2018.
24  CJEU, C-122/95, Germany v. Council of 10 March 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:94, I-00973. For further details see: M. men-
Dez, The legal effects of EU agreements, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
25  CJEU, joined cases: C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Foundation v. Council of 8 November 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, I-6351. For details see, R. uerpmann-wittzack, Rechtsfragen und Rechtsfolgendes Beitritts der Eu-
ropäischen Union zur EMRK, in Europarecht, 2012, pp. 167ss. C. nowak, Europarecht nach Lissabon, ed. Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2011. D. chaLmers, G. Davies, G. monti, EU law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. J. tiLLotson, N. 
foster, Text, cases and materials on EU law, Gavedish Publishing, New York, 2013. M. horspooL, M. humphreys, EU law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 552ss. H. satzger, International and European criminal law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. T. oppermann, C.D. cLassen, M. nettesheim, Europarecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2016.
26  In argument see: D. sarmiento, Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new frame-
work of fundamental rights protection in Europe, in Common Market Law Review, 50, 2013, pp. 1268ss.
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rights, shifting their attention to national constitutional framework27; is that of CJEU itself which has 
shown that it wishes to have more active use of these rules to examine the validity of EU acts.
15. First of all, it is significant that for the first time during the advisory procedure provided for by 
art. 218, par. 11 TEU28, CJEU considered that a draft agreement concluded by the Union should be consi-
dered contrary to primary law for reasons connected to the protection of fundamental rights. In the opinion 
n. 1/15 on the projected agreement between Canada and EU on the transfer and processing of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR)29 the compatibility of this text with some provisions of CFREU was examined.
16. CJEU considered de plano falling within the scope of application of the advisory procedure 
evidently because of the nature of primary right now attributed to CFREU, the latter stated that with respect 
to the right to personal data protection, CFREU would refer only to art. 8 CFREU not to art. 16 TFEU30 be-
cause the first provision established the conditions of data processing in a more specific way. It found that 
the provisions of the proposed agreement constituted interference with the right to privacy and in the right 
to protection of personal data, which it felt as a result of a penetrating and complex control partly not sup-
ported by sufficient justification and not consistent with the provisions contained on the point in CFREU.
17. This approach is consistent with the one on several occasions followed by CJEU with refe-
rence to secondary legislation, the validity of which has been examined in relation to specific provisions 
of CFREU. Some conclusions can be drawn from this developed practice.
18. Some provisions do not have the necessary characteristics to be used in practice as a para-
meter of validity of institutions’ acts. This applies in particular, according to the orientation expressed 
in Glatzel judgment of 22 May 201431, where they contain “principles” and are consequently unsuitable 
to confer rights to individuals, but also when they correspond to provisions of Treaties with respect to 
which CJEU exercises a non-full control32.
19. Compared to the other provisions of CFREU that can effectively constitute a parameter of 
validity of Union’s acts, CJEU exercises its control on the basis of the paradigm established by art. 52, 
par. 1 CFREU33. Following this modus procedendi CJEU every time he ascertains that the act of the 
Union brings a limitation to one of the rights protected by CFREU, he declares him invalid when he ve-
27  D.H. augenstein, Engaging the fundamentals. On the autonomous substance of EU fundamental rights law, in German 
Law Journal, 14, 2013, pp. 1918ss.
28  CH. hiLLion, P. koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 342ss. M. gatti, P. 
manzini, External representation of the European Union in the conclusion of international agreements, in Common Market Law 
Review, 49, 2012, pp. 1704ss. A. hartkamp, C. siburgh, W. Devroe, Cases, materials and text on European Union law and 
private law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017, pp. 282ss.
29  CJEU, Opinion n. 1/15 of 26 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:656, published in the electronic reports of the cases. For fur-
ther details see: E. carpaneri, N. Lazzerini, PNR: Passenger Name Record, problems not resolved? The EU PNR conundrum 
after Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU, in Air and Space Law, 42 (4/5), 2017, pp. 379ss.
30  CJEU, C-52/16, Segro of 6 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:157, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For 
further details and analysis see: N. vanDeLLe, Le contrôleur europèen de la protection des donnèes et la protection des donnèes 
personnelles dans l’administation europèenne, in Revue du Marche Commun et de l’Union Europèenne, 2012, n. 555, pp. 44ss. 
F. nicoLa, B. Davies, European Union law stories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. J. usherwooD, S. pinDer, The 
European Union. A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.
31  CJEU, C-356/12, Glatzel of 22 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:350, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
32  As we notice in the case C-444/15, Associazione Italia Nostra of 21 December 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:978, published 
in the electronic reports of the cases, that it has been stated that: “(...) that Article 38 of the Charter corresponds to Article 191 
of the TFEU, with respect to which, according to an approach developed with reference to the corresponding environmental 
regulations of the TEC, the trade union The Court must necessarily confine itself to verifying whether the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union (...) have committed a manifest error of assessment (...)” (par. 46). In argument see also: 
A. sikora, The principle of a high level of environmental protection as a source of enforceable rights, in Cahiers de Droit Eu-
ropèenne, 52 (1), 2016, pp. 400ss. F. picoD, S. van Droghenbroeck, Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union europèenne: 
Commentaire article par article, ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2017.
33  A. bionDi, P. eeckhout, S. ripLey, EU law after Lisbon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 156ss.
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rifies that this limitation is not respectful of one of the mentioned requisites34. A different approach could 
naturally be prefigured for rights considered to be of an absolute nature and not susceptible of tolerating 
limitations of any kind. However, the case law of CJEU has not examined for the time being questions 
of compatibility of acts of the Union with rights having such characteristics. From the absolute nature of 
these rights it must be consistently assumed that the relative provisions do not tolerate restrictions, not 
even in compliance with the requirements of art. 52 CFREU so that the provisions of secondary law that 
claim to limit these rights should be considered invalid.
IV. Civil judicial cooperation and the principle of mutual recognition
20. EU civil judicial cooperation policy is regulated in terms of primary law by art. 81 TFEU35, 
although this provision contains mainly rules aimed at attributing and delimiting the competence of 
Union institutions in this matter and defining legislative procedures, it also has a substantial pruning, 
where it identifies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions as founda-
tion of this cooperation.
21. The meaning of this indication contained in art. 81 TFEU deserves a reflection on mutual 
recognition, which is a very important institution in EU, initially developed with reference to freedoms 
of movement provided by Treaty of Rome in the logic of allowing the functioning of the single market. 
In speciem, in the context of the free movement of goods, the principle of mutual recognition emerged 
as a result of the persistence of a system characterized by a plurality of national regulations, allowing to 
identify a precise obligation of member states to recognize the regulations of other states as equivalent 
to their own, subject to certain exceptional hypotheses, to be interpreted restrictively. Such an obligation 
was derived directly by art. 30 EEC (provision corresponding to the current article 34 TFEU)36 that the 
CJEU has consistently deemed suitable to produce direct effects.
22. This long-standing principle of other EU policies has long been referred to in relation to civil 
judicial cooperation in which it has always been anchored in the recognition of judicial and extrajudicial 
decisions, which is one of the traditional spheres of private and procedural international law.
23. Just remember that already art. 220 of the Treaty of Rome proposed the need for negotia-
tions between member states in order to guarantee, together with other objectives, “the simplification of 
formalities to which mutual recognition and execution of judicial decisions and arbitration rulings are 
subjected”37. When the civil judicial cooperation has become a policy of the then European Community, 
art. 65 of TCE38 introduced by Maastricht Treaty, also provided that this competence included inter alia 
the adoption of measures to improve and simplify the recognition and enforcement of judgments on 
civil and commercial matters, including out-of-court decisions. After the “communitarization” of civil 
judicial cooperation, European institutions have rapidly intended to mark with particular emphasis the 
element of mutual recognition of decisions that has been identified as a cardinal element of this policy 
34  CJEU, joined cases C-92 and 93/09, Volker and Markus, Schecke and Eifert, of 9 November 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, 
I-11063, par. 65, C-291/12, Schwarz of 17 October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:670, par. 31; joined cases C-293 and C-594/12, Dig-
ital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and others of 8 April 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, par. 49. C-157/14, Neptune Distribution of 
17 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:823, parr. 68ss. C-134/15, Lidl GmbH of 30 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:498, par. 31, 
all the above cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. C-190/16, Fries of 5 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:513, 
not yet published, par. 35ss. For further details and analysis see: A. tamò-Larrieux, Designing for privacy and its legal frame-
work. Data protection by design and default for the internet of things, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2018.
35  D.A.O. eDwarD, R. Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union law, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2013. C. 
nnowak, Europarecht nach Lissabon, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011. D. chaLmers, G. Davies, G. monti, European Union law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
36  T.H. foLsom, Principles of European Union law, including Brexit, West Academic, Minnesota, 2017, pp. 278ss.
37  M. Decheva, Recht der europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018.
38  C. barnarD, S. peers, European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 586ss.
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since the conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 199939 and the consequent 
draft program adopted by the Council and the European Commission (EC)40. These guidelines have mer-
ged into art. 81 TFEU as reformulated by the Treaty of Lisbon, to indicate the main objective of civil ju-
dicial cooperation with respect to which the other competences indicated should have a servant nature41.
24. Despite this evolution, art. 81 TFEU continues to refer explicitly only to the recognition 
of judicial and extrajudicial decisions42 and does not extend to administrative acts43, nor to subjective 
situations such as personal and family status, the circulation of which may be imposed on the basis of 
provisions of primary law relating to the free movement of persons, according to an established system 
by CJEU44. Obviously, this does not exclude that the concrete application of rules on effectiveness of 
decisions (or of rules on conflict of laws) can run contrary to obligations of recognition of subjective 
situations constituted abroad connected to the protection of fundamental rights arising by CFREU, as 
occurred in the sphere of application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)45, but this 
possibility does not appear directly prefigured by the provision in question.
25. On the other hand, the Treaty provision appears structurally different from the norm enuclea-
ted by the CJEU on the basis of the current art. 34 TFEU46, since it does not establish a punctual obliga-
tion of member states to allow the recognition of decisions, but rather identifies the general objective to 
be pursued through the exercise of internal and external competence of the union in this field47.
26. Although it is unsuitable to be immediately applied as such, the principle is nevertheless 
understood by Union institutions as having its own at least programmatic content, which is transfused 
from time to time with the appropriate adaptations within the measures adopted.
27. You can groped to reconstruct the contents of the principle of mutual recognition, which it 
concretely manifests EU law on the basis of these measures, identifying the general characteristics of 
39  In particular, par. 33 of the conclusions reported: “(...) the European Council therefore approves the principle of mutual rec-
ognition which, in its opinion, should become the basis of judicial cooperation in the union in both civil and criminal matters (...)”.
40  Draft program of measures related to the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (2001/C 12/01), in OJ, no. C 12 of 15 January 2001, par. 1.
41  D. LiakopouLos, First considerations and discussion of the proposed reform of litigation competences of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, in International and European Union Legal Matters-working paper series, 2018.
42  J. tiLLotson, N. foster, Text, cases and materials on European Union law, Gavedish Publishing, New York, 2013. M. 
horspooL, M. humphreys, European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 552ss. T. oppermann, C.D. 
cLassen, M. nettesheim, Europarecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2016. R. schütze, T. triDimas, Oxford principles of European 
Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.
43  With respect to this type of acts see the Regulation n. 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 
2016 which promotes the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for the re-examination of certain public 
documents in the European Union and amending Regulation no. 1024/2012 (OJ, L 200 of 26 July 2016) adopted on the different 
legal basis of art. Art. 21 TFEU, whose art. 2, par. 4 states that “this Regulation does not apply to the recognition in a Member 
State of the legal effects relating to the content of public documents issued by the authorities of another Member State (…)”. 
See also from the CJEU, conclusions in the case C-650/13, Delvigne of 4 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:363, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases.
44  On the right to name see: CJEU: C-148/02, Garcia Avello of 2 October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:1003:539, I-11613; C-353/06, 
Grunkin and Paul of 14 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:559, I-07639; C-208/09, Sayn Wittgenstein of 22 December 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, I-13693; C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn of 12 May 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291, I-03787; 
C-438/14, Bogendorf von Wolffersdordd of 2 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:401. For further details see: A. hartkam, C. siburg, 
w. Devroe, Cases, materials and text on European Union law and private law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017.
45  A. van haken, I. motoc, The European Convention on Human rights and general international law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2018.
46  N. foster, European Union law directions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
47  Opinion 1/13 of 14 October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2303, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 45, “(...) pur-
suant to Article 218 (1) and (11) TFEU, a request for an opinion may be submitted to the Court if the Union envisages concluding 
an agreement, which implies that the latter is to be provided by one or more institutions of the Union which is vested with powers 
under the procedure provided for in Article 218 TFEU (...)”. M. kLamert, Dark matter: Competence, Jurisdiction and the area 
largely covered by EU law: Comment on Lesoochranàrske, in European Law Review, 19 (3), 2012, pp. 340-350. P. franzina, The 
external dimension of EU private international law after Opinion 1/13, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
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the model used by the institutions to implement the objective set out in the Treaty. These characteristics, 
which are already partly relevant in the case law relating to the Brussels Convention and which have 
emerged in practice in the period immediately following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty48, 
concern the elimination of procedures aimed at preventing recognition and enforcement of decisions 
from high member states; to the exceptional nature of causes which prevent the circulation of decisions, 
from the one hand, and those concerning jurisdiction and the applicable law from the other.
28. Under the first profile, moving from the principle of automatic recognition already intro-
duced by the Brussels Convention and extended by Regulation no. 2201/2003 to the registration of the 
same in public registers49, the measures adopted by EU showed a clear tendency to the abolition of exe-
quatur as a prodromal procedure to the forced execution that currently only remains between the sectors 
subject to uniform rules in matters of parental responsibility, inheritance, patrimonial relations between 
spouses and the effects of registered partnerships50. In all other matters, the execution of decisions is not 
subject to the requested state, being able to take place on the basis of a certificate or certificate issued in 
the member state of origin51.
48  In the sense of continuity of competence established by art. 67, par. 4 TFEU with the acts adopted on the basis of the 
previous art. 65 TEC, CJEU, C-551/15, Pula Parking of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, published in the electronic 
Report of the cases, par. 53
49  This is provided for in the matter of annulment of marriage, divorce and separation, by art. 21, par. 2 of the Regulation 
n. 2201/2003 for the registration of the decisions in the registers of civil status, when against being no longer allowed to appeal 
in the State of origin.
50  See in particular: Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, OJ 
L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 1–29 and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences 
of registered partnerships,OJ L 183, 8.7.2016.
51  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, entry in force from 10 January 2015. 
See in argument: P.A. nieLsen, The New Brussels I Regulation, in Common Market Law Review, 50 (3), 2013, pp. 503ss. 
P. hay, Notes on the European Union’s Brussels-I “Recast” Regulation, in The European Legal Forum, 2013, pp. 2ss. M. 
pohL, Die Neufassung der EuGVVO-im Spannungsfeld zwischen Vertrauen und Kontrolle, in Praxis des Internationalen Pri-
vat-und Verfahrensrechts, 33, 2013, pp. 109ss. a. nuyts, La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I, in Revue Critique de Droit 
International Privé, 2013, pp. 3ss. I.P. berauDo, Regards sur le nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I sur la compétence judiciaire, 
la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, in Journal du Droit International, 2013, pp. 
742ss. A. stauDinger, Schiedsspruch und Urteil mit vereinbarten Wortlaut, in Festschrift für Friedrich Graf von Westfalen, 
Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln, 2010, pp. 662ss. V. riJavec, W. JeLinek, W. brehm, Die Erleichterung der Zwangsvollstreck-
ung in Europa, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012, pp. 214ss.V. puLJko, Regulation (EU) n. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters with special reference to the relationship between 
the Regulation and arbitration, in Interdisciplinary Management Research, 17, 2015, pp. 4ss. F. gascòn-inchausti, La recon-
naissance et l’exécution des décisions dans le règlement Bruxelles I bis, in E. guinarD (eds), Le nouveau règlement Bruxelles 
I bis. Règlement n° 1215/2012 du 12 décembre 2012 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution 
des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, ed. Larcier, Bruxelles, 2014, pp. 210ss. See in argument the next cases from 
the CJEU: C-368/16, Assnes Havn v. Navigatos Management (UK) limited of 13 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:546; C-341/16, 
Hanssen Beleggingen v. Tanja Prast-Knippin of 5 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:738; C-230/15, Brite Strike Technologies 
v. Strike Strike Technologies SA of 13 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:560; C-350/14, Lazar v. Allianz SpA of 10 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:802; C-536/13, Gazprom v. Lietuvos Respublika of 4 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:316, all the above 
cited cases published in the electronic reports of the cases. For further analysis see: G. payan, Droit européen de l’exécution 
en matière civile et commerciale, ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2012. B. köhLer, Dual-use contracts as consumer contracts and no 
attribution of consumer status of a third party to the proceedings under Brussels-I Regulation, in Praxis des Internationalen 
Privat-und Verfahrensrecht, 37, 2017, n. 6 and in particular the next cases from the CJEU: C-70/15, Emmanuel Lebek v. Ja-
nusz Domino of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:524; C-12/15, Universal Music International Holding BV v. Michael Tètreault 
Shilling of 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:449; C-605/14, Virpi Kom v. Pekka Komu and Jelena Komu of 17 December 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:833; C-438/12, Irmengard Weber v. Mecthilde Weber of 3 April 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:212, the just 
cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. In particular in this ultimate case the Court has declared that: “(...) 
Since the “jurisdiction of the Court first seized (could not be) be formally established (…) the Advocate General confirmed 
(…) that there was no lis pendens in operation in this case and proceedings in the Court second seized need not be stayed. He 
relied on dicta (…) to justify that it was inappropriate for it to stay proceedings pending before it (…) the justification for the 
“reliable assessment“ this was premised on the fact that the Court first seized did not have jurisdiction and could not therefore 
either determine the question of lis pendens nor issue a judgment capable of recognition under Articles 35(1) and 45(1) (...)”. 
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29. This choice appears to be consistent with the conception of exequatur procedures as “barriers” 
to the free circulation of decisions, based on art. 81 TFEU52. Once the “sovranist” logic, rectius statist of the 
resolution has been exceeded, the need to guarantee the right to a fair trial in the execution phase is allowed, 
permitting the interested party to promptly achieve the result envisaged by the sentence. In this context, 
the position of the party that has an interest against execution is destined to receive protection no longer 
through a generalized control of foreign decisions but by means of remedies of a later nature, remitted to its 
initiative. On the other hand, this development is based on the choice to concentrate as far as possible the 
remedies available to the debtor in the member state of origin; where, as in the case of a European enforce-
ment order, no assessment is allowed to the judge of the member state of enforcement, the need to guarantee 
the rights of defense has emerged in the jurisprudence of CJEU, even when the certificate is issued53.
30. EU regulations on civilian judicial cooperation ordered the abolition of the exequatur and 
also provided for procedures aimed at allowing opposition to the recognition or enforcement of judg-
ments issued in another member state. These procedures are also carried out according to deeply diffe-
rentiated methods. Under Regulation n. 805/2004 the revocation of the European enforcement order 
certificate can be requested in the member state of origin54. Under Regulation n. 4/2009 the review of 
the decision on maintenance obligations can be requested in the member state of origin, but a refusal 
of enforcement in the requested member state can also be opposed for reasons set out in Regulation55. 
Under Regulation n. 1215/2012 the refusal of recognition or enforcement can be arranged in the re-
quested member State56. Under Regulation EU n. 655/2014 the debtor may alternatively appeal against 
We continue with the next cases: C-218/02, Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic of 17 October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:62, 
I-01241; C-190/11, Daniela Mühlleitner v. Ahmad Yusufi of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:542, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of the cases. See, J.P. berauDo, Regards sur le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I sul la compètence judiciaire, 
la reconnaisssance et l’exècution des dècisions en matière civile et commerciale, op. cit., pp. 742ss. L. grarD, La commu-
nautarisation de “Bruxelles I”, in Revue Gènèrale de Droit International Public, 117 (4), 2013, pp. 530ss. P. beaumont, M. 
Danon, K. trimmings, B. yükseL, Cross-border litigation in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. F. 
gascòn-incahusti, La reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions dans le règlement Bruxelles I bis, in E. guincharD (eds), Le 
nouveau règlement Bruxelles I bis. Règlement n° 1215/2012 du 12 décembre 2012 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la 
reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, op. cit., pp. 210ss.
52  C. tietJe, The status of international in the European legal order: the case of international Treaties and non-binding 
international instrument, in J. wouters, A. noLLkaempe, E. De wet (eds.), The europeanization of international law: The status 
of international law in the EU and its Member States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. A. kaczorowska-ireLanD, 
European Union law, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2016.
53  Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims. CJEU: joined cases C-400/13 and C-408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v. D. 
Verhagen and B. Huber v. M. Huber of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2361; C-66/17, Chudać of 14 December 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:972, above published in the electronic Reports of the cases. See in argument also: H. pèroz, Le règlement CE 
n. 805/2004 del 21 avril 2004 portant crèation d’un titre exècutoire europèen pour les crèances incontestèes, in Clunet, 2005, 
pp. 638ss. L. D’avout, La circulation automatique des titres exècutoires imposte par le règlement 805/2004 du 21 avril 2004, in 
Revue Critique de Droit International Privè, 95, 2006, pp. 2ss. A. saDLer, From the Brussels Convention to Regulation 44/2001. 
Cornerstones of a European law of civil procedure, in Common Market Law Review, 42 2005, pp. 1638ss. CJEU, C-300/14, 
Imtech Marine Belgium of 17 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:825, par. 38, where the reference to the rights of defense is 
explicitly justified on the basis of art. 47 CFREU. See also: C-511/14, Pebros Servizi of 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:448, 
par. 25, C-484/15 Zulfikarpašić of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:199, par. 48; C-289/17, Collect Inkasso of 28 February 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:133, parr. 36ss, all the ultimate cited cases published in the electronic Report of the cases.
54  See art. 10 of the Regulation n. 805/2004. The revocation may be requested if it is manifestly granted by mistake, taking 
into account the established requirements.
55  Council Regulation n. 4/2009 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation 
in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 7) 1. This Regulation is applicable via Regulation 1107/2009, art. 
15, 2009 O.J (L 3069) 1, (EC). See from the CJEU: joined cases C-400/13 and C-408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v. David 
Verhaegen and Barbara Huber v. Manfred Huber of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461; C-419/17 P, Deza/ECHA of 23 
January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:52, the cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases. In argument: N. baugui-
et, M. Dechamps, J. mary, Actualitès en droit de la familie, ed. Larcier, Bruxelles, 2016. G. cuniberti, Abolition de l’exequatur 
et présomption de protection des droits fondamentaux, in Revue Critique de Droit International Privè, 103 (1), 2014, pp. 304ss.
56  CJEU, C-306/17, Northortovà of 31 May 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:360; C-64/17, Saey Home & Garden of 8 March 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:173; C-649/16, Valach and others of 20 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:986; C-433/16, Bayerische Mo-
toren Werke of 13 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:550; C-274/16, Flightright of 7 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:160, the cited 
cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
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European sequestration order in the member state of origin or oppose the execution of the same in the 
requested member state57.
31. This model is an exception to Regulation n. 2201/200358, which for matters in which the 
exequatur is to be abolished does not admit any means of appeal against the issue of certificate or against 
the execution of the decision59.
32. Secondly, by examining the impediments to recognition and enforcement according to a con-
sistent jurisprudence of CJEU, developed with reference to provisions of the Brussels Convention60, the 
conditions impeding recognition and enforcement are mandatory and must be interpreted restrictively61. 
In essence, since the main objective of civil judicial cooperation is the free circulation of decisions, the 
effectiveness of decisions in a member state other than the one of origin can only represent the rule62 and 
the existence of causes impeding this effectiveness can be invoked only in exceptional cases63. Such an 
approach finds its explanation in the principle not expressly mentioned in Treaties but derived from CJEU 
on an inductive basis according to which a high level of mutual trust must exist among member states64.
33. These impediments are not uniformly regulated in various regulations, although they are lar-
gely attributable to a common conceptual fencing which may be contemplated in order to foreclose the 
effectiveness of a decision in other member states, related reasons, respectively to the infringement of 
57  See artt. 33-35 of the Regulation EU n. 655/2014 of European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014. Reg-
ulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account 
Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 
59–92. In speciem, The Regulation refers to the already examined regulations establishing: the European enforcement order, 
the European order for payment, the procedure for small claims and the European order for attachment. See from the CJEU: 
C-379/19, Società Immobiliare Al Bosco of 4 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:806, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases. For further details see: J.C. fernànDez rozas, Un hito más en la comunitarización del Derecho internacional privado: 
regímenes económicos matrimoniales y efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas, in La Ley Unión Europea, nº 40, 
2016. L.M. muLeiro paraDa, La cooperación reforzada en el impuesto sobre transacciones financieras, in La Ley Unión Euro-
pea, nº 22, 2015. G. paLaoaLao moreno, G. aLonso LanDeta, I. buìgues (dirs.), Sucesiones internacionales. Comentarios al 
Reglamento (UE) 650/2012, Marcial Pons, Valencia, 2015, pp. 58ss.
58  CJEU, C-345/18, ND of 20 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:749; C-325/18, C.E. and N.E. of 19 September 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:739; C-512/17, HR of 28 June 2018; ECLI:EU:C:2018:513; C-478/17, IQ of 4 October 2018; 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:812, all the cited sentences was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
59  CJEU, C-491/10 PPU, A. Zarraga v. Pelz of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, I-14247, par. 70. For further 
analysis see: A. wheLan, Of courts and constitutions. Liber amicorum in honour of Nial Fennelly, Hart Publishing, Oxford & 
Oregon, Portland, 2014, pp. 40ss. D. acosta arcarazo, C.C. murphy, European Union security and justice law. After Lisbon 
and Stockholm, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014, pp. 25ss. A. briggs, The conflict of laws, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 362ss.
60  CJEU, C-414/92, Solo Kleimotoren v. Boch of 2 June 1994, ECLI:EU:1994:221, I-02237, par. 20; C-38/98, Renault of 11 
May 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, I-02973, par. 26. For further details see: L. hauberg wiLheLmsen, International commercial 
arbitration and the Brussels II Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2018. T. kono, Intellectual property and 
private intellectual law: Comparative perspectives, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2012.
61  According to the next jurisprudence: CJEU, C-681/13, Diageo Brands of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, 
par. 41, C-455/15 PPU, P v. Q of 19 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763, par. 36, C-559/14, Meroni of 25 May 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:349, par. 38, all the above cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For further details see: 
H. schermers, Judicial remedies in the European Communities. A case book, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2013.
62  CJEU, C-571/17 PPU, Ardic of 22 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
63  In the sense that control must be particularly rigorous when it takes place only in the member state of origin and no power 
is attributed to the executing member state in this regard. See also: CJEU, C-289/17, Collect Incasso, ECLI:EU:C:2018:133, 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
64  See for further details and analysis: M. weLLer, Mutual trust. In search of the future of European Union private interna-
tional law, in Journal of Private International Law, 14 (1), 2015, pp. 64ss. D. LiakopouLos, Procedural harmonization, mutual 
recognition and multi-level protection of fundamental procedural rights, in Revista General de Processo General, 47, 2019. M. 
ziLinsky, Mutual rust and cross-border enforcement of judgments in civil matters in the European Union: Does the step-by-step 
approach work?, in Netherlands International Law Review, 64 (1), 2017, pp. 118ss. I. mevorach, The future of cross border 
insolvency: Overcoming biases and closing gaps, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018. S. hufnageL, C. mccartney, Trust in 
international police and justice cooperation, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. M. fLetcher, E. herLin-kar-
neLL, C. matera, The European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2016.
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public order limit65, the failure to notify the judicial request or the application initiating the proceedings 
and the contrast between decisions.
34. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the acts adopted to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition have the common feature of being usually structured according to the model of Brussels 
Convention, including uniform rules on jurisdiction. In the more recent instruments there are also rules 
to determine the applicable law. These norms are presented as they are in the conventions of uniform 
international law, universal in nature and therefore must be classified as true rules of conflict (and not 
mere inter regional rules). However, it is undisputed that both the rules on jurisdiction and on conflict 
of laws66 do not respond to a unitary model, since the institutions use different approaches in different 
subjects in relation to values that come from time to time, attributing where appropriate, access to justi-
ce or to foreseeability of the forum for the defendant, as well as in specific subjects, to the centrality of 
child’s position, to the favor creditoris concerning food, the need to protect the weaker contractor67 and 
the right of access to divorce and personal separation68.
35. It must be added that despite the diversity of approaches followed the presence of a uniform 
discipline of jurisdiction and of applicable law, as areas of intervention specifically provided for by art. 
81 TFEU is also instrumental in preparing a more solid foundation for two further rules that are reaffir-
med by various instruments of civil judicial cooperation and which accompany the principle of mutual 
recognition and precisely the tendential prohibition of review of the jurisdiction of the member state of 
origin and the substance of foreign decision69.
36. By imposing such prohibitions, the regulations adopted by the Union preclude that when 
a decision of a member state is to be declared effective in another member state, the latter can again 
control the jurisdiction of the court of member state of origin70, you want the accuracy of factual or legal 
assessments made by the latter or the correct application of legal rules.
37. CJEU has long said that the existence of uniform rules on jurisdiction, imposing itself on 
national courts and making it presume that in all member states their application would lead to the same 
result, justifies the absence of any control by the member state requested71, so that the uniform discipline 
of jurisdiction plays an ancillary role with respect to the objective of free circulation of decisions. A 
similar conclusion seems to be reached in relation to the existence of conflict rules, which, determining 
the need to apply the same law with respect to a given case in all member states, can only encourage 
mutual trust and ultimately the circulation of decisions.
38. Since the characteristics of the principle of mutual recognition outlined above, which are 
concretely evident from the measures adopted, are very general in scope and lend themselves to being 
implemented in very different ways. It does not seem that under art. 81 TFEU can be summarized limits 
that are particularly relevant to the action of the institutions of the Union72. This of course does not mean 
65  T. corthaut, EU ordre public, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2012.
66  D. LiakopouLos, Conflicts of law in the European Union Law, in International and European Union Legal Matters, 2010.
67  A. siany-cytermann, La protection de la partie faible en droit international privè, in Mèlanges en l’honneur de Paul 
Lagarde. Le droit international privè. Esprit et mèthodes, Brill, Hague, 2005, pp. 737ss.
68  M. ni shùLLeabhàin, Cross border divorce law. Brussels II bis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 149ss. P. beau-
mont, N. Danov, K. trimmings, Cross-border litigation in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017, pp. 804ss.
69  CJEU, C-38/98, Renault of 11 May 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, I-02973. C-681/13, Diageo Brands of 16 July 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
70  In the sense that such a review of the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin would call into question the very 
purpose of the regulations on judicial cooperation in civil matters. See also: CJEU, C-455/15, P v. Q of 19 November 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:763, published in the electronic reports of the cases. C-341/04, Eurofood of 2 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:281, 
I-03813, par, 42.
71  CJEU, C-614/10, Wolf Naturprodukte of 21 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:367, par. 25; C-456/11, Gothaer Allgemeine 
Versicherung of 15 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:719, par. 35, above the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of 
the cases.
72  F. martucci, Droit de l’Union europèenne, LGDG, Paris, 2017.
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that the objective envisaged for this provision cannot be detected in terms of teleological and systematic 
interpretation to provide useful elements for the application of individual measures73.
39. A systematic interpretation appears imposed above all by the need to avoid, as far as possi-
ble, a conflict between a law belonging to secondary legislation and CFREU. CJEU reiterated that “an 
act of the Union must be interpreted, as far as possible, so as not to undermine its validity and in accor-
dance with primary law as a whole and with the provisions of CFREU (...)”74. From a different point 
of view, the decision to take into account the requirements connected to the protection of fundamental 
rights in provisions contained in EU acts appears to be precise recalls contained in the preamble of the 
same, in order to ensure internal consistency between the act and its motivation75. The presence of such 
recalls seems to allow CJEU to identify a more solid foundation on strictly textual plane, for references 
to CFREU. The existence of a precise textual link with the rules of CFREU does not constitute a decisive 
element, since their relevance on primary law imposes the extension of the scope by way of interpreta-
tion, within an act of secondary law, also to provisions which do not explicitly refer to CFREU76.
40. In some cases CJEU has identified a closer relationship, almost of interpenetration, between 
individual provisions of CFREU and secondary legislation related to them, concluding that the discipline 
contained in the latter has the effect of realizing a certain regime of protection of fundamental rights77. 
The consequence is a lower relevance of CFREU provisions for interpretation purposes78 and on the other, 
a particular emphasis on the role of secondary law, even when this takes the form of Directive.
73  CJEU, C-551/15, Pula Parking of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, published in the electronic Report of the cases.
74  According to the case: C-579/12 RX-II, Rèexamen Commission v. Strack, ECLI:EU:C:2013:470, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of the cases, par. 40.
75  As we can see in the next cases from the CJEU: joined cases: C-175, C-176, C-178 and C-179/08, Abdulla of 2 March 2010; 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:105, I-01493, par. 54; C-486/12, X of 12 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:836, par. 29; joined cases C-148 
to C-150/13, A, B and C, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2406, par. 46; C-201/16, Shiri of 25 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:805, par. 44, 
C-360/16, Hasan of 25 Janaury 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:35, par. 31, the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
76  CJEU, C-648/11, MA and others of 6 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:367, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
77  An explicit statement to this effect is found in the principle of non-discrimination based on age, whose scope is deter-
mined by the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, published in OJ L 303, 2.12.2000. See also: CJEU, C-476/11, HK Danmark of 26 September 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:590, par. 19; C-432/14, O, of 1st October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:643, par. 21, the cited cases 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For further analysis and details see: V. hatzopouLos, The collaborative 
economy and European Union law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2018, pp. 165ss. T. srorey, A. pimor, Un-
locking European Union law, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2018, pp. 516ss. The same is also true in large part for 
the principle of non-discrimination on an ethnic basis concretized by the Directive 2000/43/EC. See the sentence C-83/14, 
VHEZ Razpredelenie of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:480, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 41ss. 
In the sense that the Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33-35. see also: D. fargrive, F. Lichère, Public procurement law. Damages as an ef-
fective remedy, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2011. S. arrowsmith, The purpose of the European Union 
procurement directives. Ends, means and the implications for national regulatory space for commercial and horizontal pro-
curement policies, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 4, 2012, pp. 5ss. C. bauDenbacher, The handbook of 
EEA law, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2015, pp. 618ss. C. De koinick, P. fLamey, European public procurement law: The European 
public procurement. Part I-Remedies, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2009, pp. 76ss. J.M. hebLy, J. brants, Euro-
pean public procurement: legislative history of the “remedies” of directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, Wolters Kluwer, 
Aalphen aan den Rijn, 2011. C. bovis, European Union public procurement law, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012, pp. 218ss. 
F. wiLman, Private enforcement of European Union law before national Courts. The European Union legislative framework, 
Edward Elgar Publishers, 2015, pp. 95ss. H. schebesta, Damages in European Union public procurement law, ed. Springer, 
Berlin, 2015, pp. 25ss. S. arrowsmith, S. treumer, Competitive dialogue on European Union procurement, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 334ss. A. sànchez graeLLs, Public procurement and the European union competition 
rules, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015. The last cited Directive find a concrete expression in the field 
of public procurement, the principle of effective judicial review. See in this spirit the case: C-35/15 P(R), Commission v. 
Vanbreda Risk & Benefits of 23 April 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:275, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 28.
78  See for example: C-416/13, Vital Pèrez of 13 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2371, published in the electronic Re-
ports of the cases, par. 25, according to which “(...) when a preliminary question concerning the interpretation of the general 
principle of non-discrimination based on age, as set out in Article 21 Charter, as well as the provisions of Directive 2000/78 
in the context of a dispute between an individual and a public administration, the Court examines the question solely in the 
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41. It follows that the lack of a detailed content in the norm of primary rank and the wide discre-
tionary space consequently reserved to secondary law cannot but affect the relevance of CFREU with 
respect to civil judicial cooperation and its ability to influence rules concerning civil judicial coopera-
tion. This conclusion is justified not only for reasons connected to the hierarchy of sources, since it is 
permissible for CFREU to model the derivative law in a more incisive way, as it is not conditioned by 
the precise provisions of the Treaties. But it also finds anchor in the content of art. 67 TFEU79 which 
expressly links the realization of the entire area of freedom, security and justice to respect fundamental 
rights to the need to ensure access to civil justice.
42. According to our opinion, the modus interpretandi used up here has two types of risks. On 
the one hand, CJEU’s practice of not always taking sufficient account of the scope and significance of 
the rights guaranteed by ECHR, as outlined by European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurispru-
dence, could cause member states to become more and more constrained in two systems, from non-
coincidental obligations, making the hypothesis of the existence of an infringement of ECHR possible 
by the states themselves. On the other hand, and consequently the inconsistency of the approach fo-
llowed could induce national judgments to perceive a lower capacity of CJEU, precisely in the matter 
of fundamental rights to provide a guide suitable to ensure compliance with the parallel obligations of 
member states with respect to CFREU and ECHR80. Thus the position of ECtHR assumes symmetric 
relevance, where for years it has elaborated with reference to relations with EU law the well-known 
doctrine of “equivalent protection”81 under which the actions of a contracting state of ECHR are presu-
med compatible with the latter whenever it has acted to fulfill the obligations arising from participation 
in an international organization, which guarantees protection of fundamental rights that qualifies as 
“equivalent” to that afforded by ECHR itself.
V. Civil judicial cooperation and values inherent to protection of fundamental rights
43. Moving from general premises found in the recalls of art. 67 TFEU to the protection of funda-
mental rights and to the principle of mutual recognition, one can question the existence of specific values re-
lating to the protection of fundamental rights that correspond to the objectives of civil judicial cooperation.
44. It can be obtained from art. 67, par. 4 TFEU the centrality of the principle of effective judicial 
protection, as protected by art. 47 CFREU82 which finds one of its areas of election in civil judicial coo-
peration. The structure of this provision as it appears from the explanations is based on articles 6 and 13 
of ECHR83 since it states in par. 1 the right to an effective remedy (wirksame Rechtsbehelf) and identifies 
in par. 2 guarantees of the fair trial by adding in par. 384 a specific reference to the right to defense at the 
expense of the state. The residual spaces within which the effective recourse guarantee is destined to be 
light of the aforementioned Directive (...) “. See also the case: C-306/16, Mario Marques da Rosa of 9 November 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:844, not yet published, where it is stated that the art. 31, par. 2 of the Charter which establishes the right to 
a limitation of the maximum duration of work and daily and weekly rest periods as well as paid annual leave, refers in practice 
to the contents of Directives 83/104 and 2003/88 so that it could not provide new elements (par. 50).
79  R. schütze, T. triDimas, Oxford principles of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.
80  See in particular: F. emmert, C. pichè carney, The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights vs. The Council of 
Europe Convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms. A comparison, in Fordham International Law Journal, 40, 
2017, pp. 1052ss.
81  P. koutrakos, M. evans, The international responsibility of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2013, pp. 297ss.
82  M. saffian, D. Düsterhau, A Union of effective judicial protection: Addressing a multi-level challenge through the lens 
of article 47 CFREU, in Yearbook of European Law, 33 (1), 2014, pp. 3ss. C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and 
effective judicial protection in European private law matters, in Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-88. Centre 
for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2012-11. G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte 
des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, in Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 106, 2016, pp. 433ss.
83  L.R. kiestra, The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on private international law, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2014.
84  CJEU, C-224/01, Köbler of 30 September 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513, I-10239.
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applied in civil-procedural context may firstly be identified where elements of attribution to the individual 
of legal positions of advantage derive from effective law provisions of the union, ie directly applicable in 
inter-private relationships and current or potential harm to such advantageous situations. The emphasis 
on the effectiveness of remedy is sufficient in the general theory of process, apart from the classical state-
ment that the duration of the process cannot be to the detriment of the party who is right85.
45. CJEU jurisprudence had already elaborated in the past general principles of law largely co-
rresponding in content to the current provision of CFREU. CJEU recalled that art. 47 CFREU leads to a 
reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection86, that had developed from the well-known 
Johnston of 15 May 198687, similarly with regard to the rights of defense88, CJEU believes that art. 47 
CFREU reiterates89 a pre-existing general principle of Union law90, including the right to be heard91, to 
be assisted by a lawyer92, to access to evidence93 and to equality of arms94.
85  The principle of effectiveness has paved the way for the extension of substantial safeguards under national private law as 
we can in the case C-295/04, Manfredi of 13 July 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, I-06619: “(... ) the useful effect of the prohibition 
enshrined (from Article 81 of the EC Treaty) would be called into question if anyone could not claim compensation for the dam-
age caused by a contract or behavior that was liable to restrict or distort competition (...)”. In the same spirit the case C-432/05, 
Unibet of 13 March 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, I-02271. For further details and analysis see: L. gruszczynski, W. werner, Def-
erence in international courts and tribunals. Standard of review and margin of appreciation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014. Always in the antitrust field the art. 47 is the compass that guides the interpretation of the uniform rules on jurisdiction in 
civil and commercial matters set out in Regulation no. 44/2001 in the case of the Advocate General Jääskinen in case C-342/14, 
Cartel Damage Claim of 11 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443: “(...) the procedural rules the right of the Union must be 
placed in some way at the service of the substantial norm of the right of the Union, in the sense that the former constitute an 
instrument that makes tangible the rights and obligations of private and public persons, particularly under the profile of the right 
to an effective remedy and fair trial enshrined in Article 47 CFREU (C-342/14, Cartel Damage Claim of 11 December 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443). In the same spirit see also: C-249/16, Kareda of 15 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:472; C-196/15, Grana-
rolo of 23 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:559; C-185/15, Kostanjevec of 12 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:763; C-605/14, 
Komu and others of 17 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:833; C-521/14 Sovag of 21 January 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:41, all 
cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
86  CJEU, C-562/13, Abdida of 18 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453, par. 45; C-239/14, Tall of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:824, par. 51, the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
87  CJEU, C-222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary of 15 May 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, 
I-01651, par. 18. In the same spirit see: joined cases: C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik of 21 February 1991, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:65 I-00415; C-465/93, Atlanta of 9 November 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:369, I-02761; C-78/98, Preston of 16 
May 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:247, I-01501; C-327/00, Santex of 27 February 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:109, I-01877. For further 
analysis see: A. barav, Judicial enforcement and implementation of European Union law, ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2017. P. 
craig, European Union administrative law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.
88  In the same spirit see from the High Court (1996), Iberian K Ltd v. BPB Industries Plc: “(...) it should be an abuse of 
process to allow the defendants to mount a collateral attack on the Commission decision in proceeding against any part before 
any national court (...)”.
89  CJEU, C-277/11, M.M. of 22 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:744, par. 81; C-560/14, M. of 9 February 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:101, above published in electronic Report of the cases.
90  CJEU, C-234/84, Belgium v. Commission, (Meura) of 10 July 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:302, I-02263, par. 27; C-301/87, 
France v. Commission, Boussac Saint Frères of 14 February 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:67, I-00307, par. 29; C-142/87, Belgium 
v. Commission of 21 March 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:125, I-00959, par. 46; C-135/92, Fiskano v. Commission of 29 June 1994, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:267, I-02885, par. 39. For further analysis see: K. Lenaerts, I. maseLis, K. gutman, European Union pro-
cedural law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 133ss. J.J. piernas Lopez, The concept of State aid under European 
Union law: from internal market to competition and beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
91  CJEU, C-349/07, Sopropè of 18 December 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, I-10369, parr. 36ss.
92  CJEU, C-7/98, Krombach v. France of 28 March 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, I-0193 I the CJEU noticed the right of 
the German Court to refuse recognition of a judgment rendered in France was based on a procedural rule which penalized the 
defendant, preventing him from pursuing his defense if he had not submitted himself in the process. The judgment of the CJEU 
did not bind the Court to a particular solution to the case (in reality, not to recognize the foreign judgment) but to rule out the non 
recognition of a breach of the Brussels if, in the Court’s view there was a manifest incompatibility of the proceedings before the 
foreign Court with the fundamental safeguards of the defense. In the same case, the ECtHR, by judgment of 13 February 2001, 
sentenced France for failing to allow the accused to appear in Court under the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which deprived 
the defendant of the defense in judgment when an alleged crime was being challenged. The CJEU referred to the case law of the 
ECtHR in defining the refusal to hear the defense of an accused absent from the hearing as a “manifest violation of a fundamental 
right” par. 40. See also: J.P. costa, La Cour europèenne des droits de l’homme. Des juges par la libertè, ed. Dalloz, Paris, 2017.
93  CJEU, C-399/99 P, Carus UK v. Commission of 2 October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:531, I-02553, parr. 19ss.
94  CJEU, joined cases C-514, C-528 to C-532/07 P, Sweden and others v. API and Commission of 21 September 2010, 
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46. The importance of the principles expressed by art. 47 CFREU in the matter of civil judicial 
cooperation derives ratione materiae from their transversal character and being able to come into relief 
with respect to all the sectors of intervention indicated in art. 81 TFEU95. The areas included stricto sen-
su in the procedural jurisdiction, such as effectiveness of decisions, judicial assistance, access to justice 
and uniform rules of civil procedure are subject to compliance with the guarantees of effective judicial 
protection. But access to justice and exercise of rights of defense96 can be conditioned by rules on con-
flicts of law, at least where these are aimed at achieving certain material objectives97.
47. The relevance of art. 47 CFREU in the system of civil judicial cooperation98 is also con-
firmed in the choice of institutions to recall this provision, with great frequency especially after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to the preamble of the adopted regulations99, mainly when they 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, I-08533, par. 85. For further details see: M. costa, The accountability gap in European Union law: mind 
the gap, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2016.
95  F. martucci, Droit de l’Union europèenne, op. cit.,
96  CJEU, C-279/09, DEB GmbH v. Germany of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, I-13849; C-156/12, GREP 
CmbH of 13 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:342; C-499/12, Gentile of 7 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:77, not yet published; 
C-498/12, Pedone of 7 February 2013, ECLI:U:C:2013:76, not yet published. For further analysis see: T. kerikmäe, Protecting 
human rights in the EU. Controversies and challenges of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ed. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 
2014, pp. 80ss. S. DougLas-scott, N. hatzis, Research handbook on European Union law and human rights, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, Cheltenham, 2017, p. 511ss. S. morano foaDi, L. vickers, Fundamental rights in the European union: A matter for 
two courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015. P. craig, European Union administrative law, op. cit.,
97  Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L 343, 29.12.2010, p. 10-16. See also in the same spirit: art. 4 of the 2007 Hague 
Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations (subject of the 2009/941/EC decision of the Council of 30 November 
2009, concerning the conclusion by the European Community of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the applicable 
law to maintenance obligations, in OJ No. L 331 of 16 December 2009, page 17ss), which provides for certain food creditors 
to derogate from the designation of the applicable law where the lex causae does not allow them to obtain the food. See also: 
P. Jur ys, P.F. kJaer, R. yatsunami, Regulatory hybridization in the transnational sphere, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2013, pp. 268ss. u. magnus, p. mankowski, Brussels IIbis Regulation, ed. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2012, pp. 88ss.
98  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union europèenne, op. cit.,
99  See the formula contained in the 11th recital of Regulation n. 805/2004 (Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ L 143, 
30.4.2004, p. 15–39) where reference was made in general to the right to a fair trial. Subsequently the 39 recital of the Regulation 
n. 1214/2012 (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1214/2012 of 17 December 2012 establishing the standard import 
values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables OJ L 348, 18.12.2012, p. 14–15), the 44th recital of Regula-
tion n. 655/2014. The 83 recital of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 19-72. See also: C. Lisanti, L. sautonie-Laguionie, Règlement UE n. 2015/848 du 
20 mai 2015 relatif aux procèdures d’insolvabilitè, in Societè de lègislation comparèe, Trans Europe experts, 2016. The 73 recit-
al of Regulation 2016/1103, the 71th recital of Regulation 2016/1104 in which the formula refers less happily to the right to an 
effective appeal and to an impartial judgment (but the English version mentions: “the right to an effective remedy and to a fair 
trial “and the German one:” das Recht auf einen wirksamen Rechtsbehelf und ein faires Verfahren”). The 5th recital of the Coun-
cil Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum com-
mon rules relating to legal aid for such disputes OJ L 26, 31.1.2003, p. 41–47. For a reference to the right to a right adversarial 
principle without mention of art. 47 see recital 9 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation 
(EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 341, 24 December 2015, p. 1-13. P. cortès, Does the 
proposed European procedure enhance the resolution of small claims?, in Civil Justice Quarterly, 27 (1), 2008, pp. 94ss. F. wiL-
man, Private enforcement of European Union law before national courts. The European Union legislative framework, Edward 
Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2015. E. mšćenić, A. raccah, Legal risks in European Union law. Interdisciplinary studies on legal 
risk management and better Regulation in Europe, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2016, pp. 80ss. P. coppeL, Information rights: law and 
practice, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014. K. kerameus, L’harmonisation procédurale dans le monde contem-
porain, in L. vogeL, La procédure entre tradition et modernité, èd. Panthéon-Assas, Paris, 2010, pp. 10ss. D. miLman, Personal 
insolvency law. Regulation and policy, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2017, pp. 2048ss. F. toLmie, Corporate and personal 
insolvency law, ed. Wolters, Kluwer, The Hague, 2013. G. mccormack, Something old, something new: Recasting the European 
insolvency Regulation, in The Modern Law Review, 79, 2016, pp. 122ss. M. rrequeJo isiDro, La cooperaciòn judicial en materia 
de insolvencia transfronteriza en la propuesta de Regulation del Parlamento europeo y del consejo por el que se modifica el 
Regulation (CE) n. 1346/2000 sobre procedimientos de insolvencia, in Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado, 13, 
2013, pp. 218ss. V. finch, D. miLman, Corporate insolvency law. Perspectives and principles, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2017, pp. 486ss. S. gopaLan, M. guihot, Cross-border insolvency law and multinational enterprise groups. Judicial inno-
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vation as and international solution, in George Washington International Law Review, 49, 2016, pp 4ss. S. mock, Das geplante 
neue europäische Insolvenzrecht nach dem Vorschlag der Kommission zur Reform der EuInsVO, in Zeitschrift für Gemeinschafts-
privatrecht, 10, 2013, pp. 137ss. A. piekenbrock, The future scope of the European Insolvency Regulation, in International Insol-
vency Law Review, 23 (3), 2014, pp. 434ss. C. thoLe, Die Reform der Europäischen Insolvenzverordnung, in Zeitschrift für Eu-
ropäisches Privatrecht, 22, 2014, pp. 40ss. B. wesseLs, What is an insolvency proceeding anyway?, in International Insolvency 
Law Review, 20 (4), 2011, pp. 492ss. G. moss, I. fLetcher, S. isaacs, The EC Regulation on insolvency proceedings, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009. T. rauscher, Europäisches Zivilprozess-und Kollisionsrecht, Europäisches Zivilprozess-und Kol-
lisionsrecht (EuZPR/EuIPR), ed. Verlag O. Schmidt, Heidelberg, 2010, Art. 1 paras. 2-4. C. thoLe, Sanierung mittels Scheme of 
Arrangement im Blickwinkel des Internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts, in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens und Gesellschafts-
recht, 42, 2013, pp. 110ss. M. veDer, The Future of the European Insolvency Regulation-Applicable law, in particular security 
rights, in International Insolvency Law Review, 20 (2), 2011, pp. 286ss. A.J. běLohLàvek, Effects of Opening (Commencement) of 
Insolvency Proceedings on Pending Lawsuits and Similar Proceedings under Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 
of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings and under Article 18 of the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 
2015/848, in Czech Yearbook of International Law, 7, 2016, pp. 69ss. S. bLock-Lieb, The UK and EU cross-border insolvency 
recognition: From empire to Europe to going it alone, in Fordham International Law Journal, 42, 2017, pp. 1374ss. F.M. mucc-
iareLLi, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU, in Tulane Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law, 21, 2012, pp. 440ss. J. roDrìguez roDrigo, El centro de intereses principales, como foro de 
competencia internacional en el Reglamento 1346/2000, en relación con empresas de un grupo de sociedades, in Anuario de 
Derecho Concursal, 2014, pp. 502ss. G. garcìa-rostàn, El proceso consurcal ante insolvencias conexas, Tirant Lo Blanch, Va-
lencia, 2015. M. LLorente sànchez-arJona, Tratamiento procesal de la insolvencia transfronteriza en la Unión Europea, Tirant 
Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2013, pp. 76ss. J. rroDrìguez roDrig, Bienes sujetos a un procedimiento secundario de insolvencia. Comen-
tario a la sentencia del Tribunal de justicia de la Uniòn europea de 11 Junio 2015, Nortel, C-649/13, in Cuadernos de Derecho 
Transnacional, 9 (3), 2017, pp. 694ss. G. mccormack, Reconciling European conflicts and insolvency law, in European Business 
Organization Law Review, 15, 2014, pp. 335ss. I. Linna, Actio pauliana and res judicata in European Union insolvency proceed-
ings, in Journal of Private International Law, 14 (4), 2015, pp. 570ss. B. xie, Comparative insolvency law: The pre-pack approach 
in corporate rescue, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2016, pp. 272ss. A. Jakab, D. kochenov, The enforcement of Europe-
an Union Law values: ensuring Member States compliance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 208ss. A. keay, The 
harmonization of he avoidance rules in European Union insolvencies, in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 67, 
2017, pp. 80ss. G. mccormack, A. keay, S. brown, European insolvency law: Reform and harmonization, Edward Elgar Publish-
ing, Cheltenham, 2017, pp. 174ss. M. born, Europäisches Kollisions Recht des Effektengiros: Intermediatisierte Wertpapiere im 
Schnittfeld Internationalem Sallen-Schuld und Insolvenzrecht, ed. M. Siebeck, 2014, pp. 189ss. A. keay, Security rights, the Eu-
ropean Insolvency Regulation and concerns about the non-application of avoidance rules, in European Law Review, 22, 2016, pp. 
73ss. G. moss, I.F. fLetcher, S. issacs (eds), The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A commentary and annotated guide, 
(2nd ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 12ss. G. mccormack, Secured credit and the harmonisation of law, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 58ss. R.J. De weiJs, Towards an objective European rule on transaction avoidance in 
insolvencies, in International Insolvency Review, 21, 2011, pp. 220ss. J. garriDo, Two snowflakes the same: The distributional 
question in international bankruptcies, in Texas International Law Journal, 47, 2011-212, pp. 460ss. S. Levmore, Harmonization, 
preferences, and the calculus of consent in commercial and other law, in Common Market Law Review, 50, 2013, pp. 250ss. L. 
caDiet, E. JeuLanD, S. amrani-mekki, Droit processuel civil de l’Union européenne, ed. LexisNexis, Paris, 2011, pp. 350ss. E. 
fabries-Lecea, Le règlement “insolvabilité”: Apport à la construction de l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, ed. Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 614ss. F. JauLt-seseke, D. robine, Le droit européen des procédures d’insolvabilité à la croisée des chemins, 
ed. Lextenso, Paris, 2012, pp. 242ss. L.S. seaLy, D. miLman, Annotated guide to the insolvency legislation, ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2014. T. arons, Recognition of debt restructuring and resolution measures under the European Union regulatory frame-
work, in International Insolvency Review, 24, 2014, pp. 58ss. Y. bruLarD, Que penser de la proposition de la Commission sur les 
groupes de sociétés dans le projet de nouveau règlement insolvabilité?, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2013, pp. 68ss. R. 
Dammann, S. miLLet, L’action en revendication exercée au titre d’une clause de réserve de propriété relève-t-elle du champ d’ap-
plication du règlement Bruxelles I?, in Revue Lamy Droit Civil, 2010, pp. 32ss. C. kesseDJian, L’espace judiciaire civile et com-
mercial européen: le règlement Bruxelles I refondu, in Revue Gènèrale de Droit International Public, 117, 2013, pp. 546ss. 
R. Dammann, Application du Règlement (CE) numéro 1346/2000 modifié aux groupes de sociétés, in Revue des Procédures Col-
lectives, 2013, pp. 65ss. D. fasqueLLe, Raisons et contours d’une refonte nécessaire du règlement (CE) 1346/2000, in Bulletin Joly 
Entreprises en Difficulté, 2012, pp. 52ss. D. fasqueLLe, L’Europe: une opportunité pour les professions d’AJMJ et pour le mandat 
de justice?, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2013, pp. 50ss. G.C. giorgini, Le centre des intérêts principaux du débiteur in-
solvable en droit comparé, in Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 64, 2012, pp. 868ss. L.C. henry, Compétence internatio-
nale du Tribunal pour ouvrir une procédure d’insolvabilité en cas de transfert de siège statutaire, in Bulletin Joly Entreprises en 
Difficulté, 2012, pp. 35ss. L.C. henry, De l’art d’articuler la procédure principale et la procédure secondaire, in Revue des So-
ciétés, 2012, pp. 186ss. L.C. henry, Eclairage-Règlement insolvabilité européen et groupes de sociétés: je t’aime moi non plus!, 
in Bulletin Joly Entreprises en Difficulté, 2012, pp. 355ss. L.C. henry, Règlement insolvabilité européen et les groupes: bilan et 
perspectives. Une approche textuelle, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2013, pp. 59ss. L. iDot, Un nouveau chantier pour les 
juristes: la révision du règlement “procédures d’insolvabilité, in La Semaine Juridique (Europe), 2013, pp. 4ss. V. LegranD, 
Quelle clôture pour la procédure européenne d’insolvabilité?, in Lettre d’Actualité des Procédures Collectives Civiles et Com-
merciales, 2013, pp. 112ss. A. LienharD, Procédure d’insolvabilité: notion de “centre des intérêts principaux”, in Recueil Dalloz 
Sirey, 2011, pp. 2916ss. R. Lowe, From client money rules to the EC Insolvency Regulation, legislative change beckons, in Insol-
vency Intelligence, 29, 2014, pp. 48ss. T. mastruLLo, L’extension de procédure collective pour cause de confusion des patrimoines 
est-elle compatible avec le règlement numéro 1346/2000?, in Revue des Sociétés, 2010, pp. 594ss. T. mastruLLo, Procédures 
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contain a discipline of jurisdiction and effectiveness of decisions. This choice is not without practical 
consequences because the presence of a timely reminder in the preamble makes it more likely that CJEU 
will refer you in its rulings.
48. This choice is not without practical consequences because the presence of a timely reminder 
in the preamble makes possible CJEU refer to in its rulings.
49. Although the right to effective judicial protection is the only one that can be considered ex-
pressly referred to by the rules of treaty in subiecta matter. Institutions clearly shows to recognize also in art. 
21 of CFREU100 a provision destined to have wide repercussions on civil judicial cooperation. In some re-
gulations concerning family matter and in Regulation n. 650/2012 in the matter of succession be considered 
to insert explicit references to the principle of non-discrimination, evidently on the assumption of particular 
importance of the same in EU101. The mention of art. 21 TFEU in the preamble of regulations is sometimes 
of a general nature102 and indeed the provision is listed together with others103, acting only as a reference to 
interpret and apply the Regulation in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination. In other cases the 
reference to the principle contained in the preamble104 or in the text itself of Regulation105, is more precise, 
since it aims at guiding the application of well-defined provisions such as public order clause106 or the condi-
tions impeding recognition and execution of decisions. On this point CJEU’s jurisprudence has not yet been 
expressed and the scope of these claims appears for the moment not wholly clear or ambivalent107.
d’insolvabilité transfrontalières: la reconnaissance mutuelle conditionnée par le respect du droit d’accès au juge, in Revue des 
Sociétés, 2011, pp. 8ss and 443-447. M. menJucq, L’extension de procédure pour confusion de patrimoines passée au crible du 
règlement n° 1346/2000: une question à suspense!, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2010, pp. 2ss. M. menJucq, La proposi-
tion de règlement modifiant le règlement (CE) n°1346/2000 sur les procédures d’insolvabilité: une évolution mais pas de révolu-
tion, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2013, pp. 20ss. I. merovach, European insolvency law in a global context, in Journal 
of Business Law, 13, 2011, pp. 668ss. I. merovach, The new proposed regime for EU corporate groups in insolvency: a critical 
note, in Corporate Rescue and Insolvency, 2013, pp. 90ss. C. moiLLe, Un point sur les conditions de la mise en oeuvre de la 
procédure intiale d’insolvabilité et son extension, in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 50, 2013, pp. 28ss. P. nabet, Bref 
aperçu du projet de la commission pour la révision du règlement (CE) n° 1346/2000 sur l’insolvabilité, in Les Petites Affiches, 
2013, pp. 6ss. J. payne, Cross-border schemes of arrangement and forum shopping, in European Business Organization Law 
Review, 14,m 2013, pp. 564ss. P. rousseL-gaLLe, La proposition de révision du règlement n° 1346/2000 sur les procédures d’in-
solvabilité, entre prudence et audace, in La Semaine Juridique (édition entreprise), 2013, pp. 14ss. J.L. vaLLens, Tourisme judici-
aire et insolvabilité: les risques du forum shopping, in Revue des Procédures Collectives, 2012, pp. 10ss. G.F. schLaefer, Forum 
shopping under the regime of the European insolvency Regulation, in International Insolvency Institute, International Insolvency 
Studies, 2010, pp. 26ss. C. honorati, G. corvo, A double lesson from Interedil: higher Courts, lower Courts and preliminary 
ruling and further clarifications on COMI and establishment under EU insolvency Regulation, in International Insolvency Law 
Review, 21 (4), 2012, pp. 655ss. C.H. van rhee, Harmonisation of civil procedure: An historical and comparative perspective, in 
X.E. kramer, C.H. van rhee, Civil litigation in a globalizing World, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2012, pp. 41ss.
100  S. peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Port-
land, 2014
101  CJEU, C-20/17, Oberle of 21 June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:485; C-218/16, Kubicka of 12 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:755, 
above cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
102  See also recital 49 of Regulation n. 1259/2010. For further analysis see: U. magnus, p. mankowski, Brussels IIbis Reg-
ulation, op. cit.,
103  See recital n. 73 of Regulation 2016/1103 and recital n. 71 of Regulation 2016/1104.
104  According to recital n. 25 of Regulation n. 1259/2010: “(...) the courts should not be able to apply the public policy 
exception in order not to take into account a provision of the law of another State if this is contrary to CFREU, in particular to 
the art 21 prohibiting any form of discrimination See also recital No. 58 of Regulation No. 650/2012 which pays more broadly, 
that “(...) the courts or other competent authorities should not be allowed to make use of of the public objection to waive the 
law of another Member State or to refuse to recognize-or if appropriate, to accept-or to execute a decision, a public instrument 
or a court settlement issued in another Member State, if that occurred in violation of the CFREU, in particular of his art. 21 
which prohibits any form of discrimination (...) “The same clause recurred in recital No. 54 of Regulation 2016/1103 and in 
recital No. 53 of Regulation 2016/1104.
105  Pursuant to art. 58 of Regulation 2016/1103 and of Regulation 2016/1104: “(..) the courts and other competent author-
ities of the Member States shall apply Article 37 of this Regulation in compliance with the fundamental rights and recognized 
principles of the Charter, in particular Article 21 on the principle of non-discrimination (...)”.
106  E. Louin, El orden pùblico y el arbitraje, Editorial Universidad del Rosario, Bogotà, 2017.
107  In this spirit see from the CJEU, conclusions of the Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in case C-372/16, Sahyouni, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:686, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 84. The principle of non-discrimination referred to 
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50. Especially in the field of application of civil cooperation measures in family matters, the 
protection of fundamental rights of child, as provided for by art. 24 of CFREU and explicitly mentioned 
only in the preamble of Regulation no. 2201/2003108. As is clear from the explanations, the provision 
intends to refer to the provisions of New York Convention of 1989 on the rights of child, notwithstan-
ding that only some of them are referred to as the source of inspiration for the text of art. 24 TFEU109, 
the entire text of Convention, ratified by all member states of the union and already referred to in the 
past by CJEU as a basis for the general principles of law, inevitably assumes a broader significance. The 
jurisprudence has already amply highlighted the centrality of the principle of the best interests of the 
child as a criterion that must guide all choices concerning him110 and stressed the importance of latter’s 
right to be heard before the national court111.
51. The preambles to regulations adopted so far refer to further fundamental rights protected by 
CFREU (such as the right to privacy and family life, the right to marry and establish a family, the right to 
protection of personal data, the right to property), whose relevance is linked to the specific object of indi-
vidual acts. Naturally, these references cannot exhaust the list of fundamental rights that can be detected 
in matters of civil judicial cooperation, not only because CJERU can not be bound, where it has to assess 
needs linked to the guarantee of an instrument belonging to primary law, from the contents of an act of se-
condary law but also because already with respect to the measures adopted so far it appears possible to iden-
tify, within CFREU, additional parameters that could be relevant in the interpretation and application of the 
same112. On the other hand, the general scope of protection of fundamental rights and the need to respect 
them in all areas falling within the scope of civil judicial cooperation of union leads to the exclusion of any 
attempt to delineate ex ante a predefined group of relevant rights in the system of civil judicial cooperation.
VI. The scope of application of CFREU in the system of civil judicial cooperation
52. It should be borne in mind that, by their very nature, the rules on civilian judicial cooperation 
are intended to be applied essentially by member states, since it is not in principle possible to establish 
an executive activity on the part of European Institutions.
53. With reference to the acts of member states, in the general principle of art. 51, par. 1 the 
scope of application of CFREU coincides with the scope of EU law113.
herein to exclude the applicability of the law of a third State which provides for divorce by a unilateral will of the husband (also in 
a situation in which Regulation No. 1259/2010 was applicable, for the purpose of recognition a divorce decision issued in Syria, by 
express reference to the German law and not in force). The issue has not been addressed in the judgment Sahyouni of 20 December 
2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:988, having been deemed that Regulation no. 1259/2010 is not applicable to divorces of a private nature.
108  CJEU, C-111/17 PPU, OL of 8 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436; C-565/17, Saponaro and Xylina of 19 April 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:265, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
109  For further details see: J.P. Doek, T. LiefaarD (eds.), Litigating the rights of the child. The UN Convention on the rights 
of the child in domestic and international jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. T. LiefaarD, J. sLoth-nieLsen, 
The United Nations Convention on the rights of the child, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2016, pp. 228ss. W. vanDenhoLe, E. Desmet, D. 
reynaert, Routledge international handbook of children’s rights studies, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2015. I. iusmen, 
H. staLforD, The European Union as a children’s rights. Actor, law policy and structural, Barbara Budrich Publishers, Opladen, 
Berlin, Toronto, 2016. R. Lamont, Family law, Oxford university Press, Oxford, 2018.
110  On the inextricable link between consideration of the child’s best interests and respect for his fundamental rights see 
from the CJEU C-428/15, D. (Child and Family Agency) of 27 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:819, par. 44.
111  CJEU, C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, I-14247 par. 61 on the basis of this 
ruling, the proposal for the revision of Regulation no. 2201/2003, COM (2016) 411 final of 30 June 2016 contemplates the art. 20, 
concerning “the right to express the common opinion” that would establish a more precise obligation also with respect to art. 12 of the 
1989 New York Convention, for the judges of the member states to proceed to the listening of the child if “capable of discernment”.
112  By way of example, articles 15 and 16 concerning professional freedom and the freedom to conduct a business with 
regard to contractual and non-contractual obligations can be cited. Articles 23 relating to equality between men and women 
and 30-33 relating to guarantees of workers’ rights, in the matter of employment contracts. Article 38 concerning consumer 
protection still in the matter of contractual obligations.
113  CJEU, conclusions in the case: C-524/15, Menci of 12 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:667, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of the cases.
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54. In Åkerberg Fransson case114, CJEU was partially identified the scope, delimitating as a 
parameter to be used for this purpose the existence of a relevant link between domestic and EU law. In 
particular, this implies that, with respect to the specific case examined by the judge, the relevant national 
legislation is used to guarantee the implementation of Union law or produces such an effect115.
55. This broad criterion apparently has general scope and is intended to apply also with respect 
to the field of civil judicial cooperation, which also presents some peculiarities from this point of view, 
since the rules that are considered therein pertaining to the determination and the coordination of ju-
risdiction, judicial assistance in the conduct of civil proceedings of a uniform nature, the identification 
of the applicable law or finally the effectiveness of foreign decisions presented as instrumental to the 
conduct of civil proceedings. It may happen that the object of the latter is wholly unrelated to the scope 
of EU law, when the need to apply any EU law does not arise from a material law perspective. Similarly, 
it may happen that the conduct of the process is entirely governed by the internal law of a member state 
and that only a well-defined basis of it (for example, the assumption of a foreign approval) is subject to 
uniform rules on civil judicial cooperation. In such situations it is questionable whether the mere fact 
that the civil trial before the national court is subject to uniform rules of EU law is sufficient to place the 
whole case under the orbit of the provisions of CFREU.
56. According to our opinion the answer cannot be unitary, but requires taking into considera-
tion the nature of various instruments that may be considered for this purpose and the forecasts con-
tained in them with reference to relations with national law. It can move from a general consideration, 
concerning the need to consider subject to EU law only those cases that have transnational implications, 
meaning for them, according to a generally broad conception, those presenting elements of contact with 
several member states or with a member state and a third state.
57. With regard to the rules on jurisdiction, it is a general principle affirmed by CJEU already 
with reference to Brussels Convention, that according to which the conditions provided for by the Union 
are present because the case falls within its material and personal scope. Determination of jurisdiction is 
regulated by uniform rules towards third states116. On the other hand, with the exception of Regulation 
n. 1215/2012 (which uses the criterion of domicile of the defendant on the basis of the archetype of the 
Brussels Convention), the determination of jurisdiction is exhaustively ratione personae, whether the 
rules of national jurisdiction come to certain conditions referred to and therefore attracted to the scope 
of the Union Regulation117, whether the uniform rules completely replace national jurisdiction rules118. It 
114  CJEU, C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson of 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:10, published in electronic reports of 
the cases, par. 19ss. It is no coincidence that references to the most prominent court rulings are aimed solely at enhancing the 
binding nature of the general EU principles (CJEU, C-4/73, Nold of 14 May 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, I.00491, par. 13; case 
C-44/79, Hauer of 13 December 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, I-03727, parr. 15-16; case C-5/88, Wachauf of 13 July 1989, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:321, I-02669, par. 17) although, constant references to the content of the Convention as a parameter to deter-
mine the content of these principles are not lacking (see also the case: C-260/89, ERT of 18 June 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, 
I-02925, par. 41). For further details and analysis see: M. broberg, N. fenger, Preliminary references to the European Court 
of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 402ss. L.J. conant, Justice contained. Law and politics of the European 
Union, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2018. G. beck, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2013. M. DerLèn, J. LinDhoLm, The Court of Justice of the European Union. Multidici-
plinary perspectives, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2018.
115  The same spirit of orientation also in the next cases: CJEU, C-206/13, Siragusa of 6 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, 
published in the electronic reports of the cases. C-482/10, Cicala of 21 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C.2011:868, I-14139. For 
further details see: P. craig, European Union administrative law, op. cit., M. broberg, N. fenger, Preliminary references to the 
European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.
116  CJEU, C-281/02, Owusu of 1st March 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:120, I-01383, relating to a situation in which the defen-
dant was domiciled in the territory of a Contracting State but most of the other items were in a third State. For further details 
see: J. hiLL, A. chong, International commercial disputes: commercial conflict of laws in English Courts, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2018.
117  According to the artt. 7 and 14 Regulation n. 2201/2003. On the methods for applying the first provision, see from the 
CJEU: C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez of 29 November 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:740.
118  As happens starting from Regulation n. 4/2009. See also from the CJEU the next cases: C-214/17, Mölk of 20 September 
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should also be added that national rules can be considered integrated into EU rules also whenever they 
are explicitly or implicitly referred to some of the elements that underlie the title of jurisdiction119 or to 
allow the functioning of rules related to determination120 or coordination of jurisdiction121.
58. To the extent that the assessment of jurisdiction takes place on the basis of Union or national 
rules referred to therein, there is no doubt that it falls within the scope of CFREU, which also extends 
to all those other aspects of the process that find their discipline in union instruments in connection with 
the determination of jurisdiction. This includes verifying the admissibility of the action, including in 
relation to the notification of application, the determination and effects of liaison and connection122; as 
well as the profiles relating to the precautionary jurisdiction and the conditions for the exercise of the 
same, sometimes governed directly by the uniform rules123.
59. Member states are certainly called upon to take into account the provisions of CFREU when 
they give concrete application to the rules of EU, but this does not exhaust the scope of relevance of 
CFREU. Although it certainly does not pose the ultimate conclusion that the determination of juris-
diction on the basis of uniform rules implies that the internal conduct of the procedure is only for this 
reason to be considered subject to EU law, all national provisions must be included in this which are 
also used to implement uniform rules on jurisdiction or which have effects on their application. It seems 
that those rules that regulate procedures or mechanisms functional to the establishment of jurisdiction in 
transnational situations when they are used within the scope of regulations pursuant to art. 81 TFEU124, 
and those rules that may have the effect of limiting or preventing the exercise of jurisdiction established 
on the basis of these regulations125. On the contrary, it is doubtful whether the rooting of jurisdiction on 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:744; C-558/16, Mahnkopf of 1st March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:138; C-467/16, Schlömp of 20 De-
cember 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:993 all the cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
119  See in particular the art. 62 of Regulation n. 1215/2012 relative to the determination of the domicile of the parties ac-
cording to the national law of the court seised or of the place of domicile. An implicit reference is also made when the title of 
jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of one of the parties, which remains governed, in principle, by the domestic law of the 
Member States. The relevance of state citizenship as a prerequisite for European citizenship can moreover, some aspects of 
the first under the law of the European Union, as held by CJEU C-135/08, Rottmann of 2 March 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104 
I-01449. On the question of the multiple citizenships in the presence of a title of jurisdiction founded on the citizenship, see 
from the CJEU the case C-168/08, Hadadi of 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:474, I-06871.
120  For example regarding the tacit extension of jurisdiction pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulation n. 1215/2012. See also 
from the CJEU the case: C-327/10, Hypote nì banka of 17 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:745 I-0000, par. 37; C-350/14, 
Lazar of 12 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:802; C-297/14, Hobobm of 8 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:556, the 
above cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For further details see: P. beuamont, M. Danon, K. trimmings, 
B. yükseL, Cross-border litigation in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017.
121  This applies, for example, to the profiles relating to the application of the uniform criterion of provenance laid down 
by the regulations for the purposes of lis pendens and connection, such as that outlined in art. 32 of Regulation n. 1215/2012.
122  On the innovative character of the articles 33 and 34 of Regulation n. 1215/2012 which also regulate lis pendens and 
the connection with cases pending in third States see: F. marongiu buonauti, Lis alibi pendens and related actions in the rela-
tionships with the courts of third countries in the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 
2014, pp. 88ss.
123  See the art. 20 of the Regulation n. 2201/2003 regarding provisional and precautionary measures in matrimonial matters 
of parental responsibility, and above all Regulation n. 655/2014 regarding the attachment of bank accounts. D. LiakopouLos, 
European integration and its relation with the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights and private international law 
of European Union, in Homa Publica.Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Impresa, 2 (2), 2018.
124  For this solution with reference to the national procedures applicable to the return of the child see form the CJEU the 
case: C-498/14 PPU, Bradbrooke of 9 January 20015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:3, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 
52. D. LiakopouLos, Protection of human rights between European Court of Human Rights and Court of European Union, in 
International and European Union Legal Matters, 2015.
125  On the use of anti-suit injunction in the field of application of Regulation no. 44/2001 see from the CJEU the case: 
C-185/07, Allianz of 11 February 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:69, I-00663. With respect to the scope of the Brussels Convention, 
see the case C-159/02, Turner of 27 April 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:228, I-03565. See also: T. kruger, Civil jurisdiction rules of 
the EU and their impact on third State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 262ss. A. saDLer, From the Brussels Con-
vention to Regulation 44/2001. Cornerstones of a European law of civil procedure, in Common Market Law Review, 42 2005, 
pp. 1638ss. See also the next cases from the CJEU: C-325/18 PPU, C.E. and N.E. of 19 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:739; 
C-595/17, Apple Sales International and others of 24 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:854; C-337/17, Fenikes of 4 October 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:805, all of them published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
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the basis of a title envisaged or referred to by EU law can make the provision of CFREU relevant to the 
reasonable duration of the process relevant to the relevant judgment, in consideration of the negative 
sign in the past by CJEU on this specific point.
60. With regard to mutual legal assistance, the principle expressed in Åkerberg Fransson sen-
tence seems to operate in a substantially similar manner, since EU instruments regulate a specific phase 
or procedural activity with uniform rules (the notification of an act), which only falls within the scope 
of EU law.
61. They need to be integrated by rules of the member state in which the activities must be ca-
rried out as punctually provided for by art. 10 of Regulation n. 1206/2001 on the execution of requests 
for recruitment of evidence coming from the judicial authority of another member state or from art. 7 
of Regulation no. 1393/2007 for the execution of requests for notification following transmission to the 
receiving agency126. It is evident that when the national procedural rules are applied to the execution 
of a request for judicial assistance based on acts and regulations, they are still absorbed in the field of 
application of EU law with the consequent need to take account of the related needs of CFREU.
62. A specific problem may arise with regard to the consequences that the judicial assistance 
activities carried out in the requested member state can produce in the trial before the judicial authority 
of the home member state. One might ask whether the national rules governing the effects that the jud-
ge is called upon to draw from the notification of a judicial act pursuant to Regulation n. 1393/2007 or 
the evaluation of tests undertaken pursuant to Regulation n. 1206/2001 can present a connection with 
the scope of EU law and therefore be correlated with the protection of fundamental rights provided by 
CFREU. In consideration of the criterion used by CJEU to apply art. 51, par. 1 CFREU127 and the strictly 
procedural nature of the instruments in question, it seems to us that in these cases the application of na-
tional law can be considered connected with EU law when the judge is called to draw consequences on 
the procedural level from the notification of a judicial act (for example, for the purposes of defending a 
term) or evidence taken abroad (for example, in relation to its admissibility or the manner in which it is 
recruited)128, but not when these consequences are reflected in the application of material law, which can 
remain totally unrelated to the scope of EU law.
63. Where regulations in accordance with art. 81 TFEU providing for uniform civil proceedings, 
it is necessary to take into account, first of all, the optional nature of these proceedings. Therefore, only 
in the presence of a choice of the plaintiff to substantiate the same, the case may fall within the scope 
of EU law129.
126  D. LiakopouLos, Protection of human rights between European Court of Human Rights and Court of European Union, 
in International and European Union Legal Matters, 2015.
127  J. meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
128  In the sense that even in a case where the court of the Member State of origin chooses not to resort to the rules of Regu-
lation n. 1206/2001 and apply the national law to sue before a witness living abroad, the consequences of the failure to appear 
a witness must be appreciated according to the law of the member state of origin “provided they are applied in compliance with 
the law ‘Union (...)”. See also from the CJEU C-170/11, Lippens of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:540, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases, parr. 38ss. The application of national procedural law to the consequences of the unjustified 
refusal to receive the notification see the case C-384/14, Alta Realitat of 28 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:316, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases, par. 81ss.
129  CJEU, C-618/10, Banco Espaňol de crèdito of 14 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, par. 79; C-488/13, Parva Investit-
sionna Banka of 9 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2191, above published in the electronic Reports of the cases. The differ-
ent conclusion reached in the cited obiter dicta of the Lippens of 6 September 2012 seems justified by the fact that Regulation 
n. 1206/2001 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States 
in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 174, 27.6.2001, p. 1-24) not expressly qualified as an instrument 
of an optional nature, even if the CJEU considered that the judge can choose to cite a witness before him/herself, without apply-
ing the Regulation. For further analysis see: M. cremona, H.W. mickLitz, Private law in the external relations of the European 
Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. D. LiakopouLos, Conflicts of law in the European Union Law, in International 
and European Union Legal Matters, 2010. L. iDot, S. franq, J. baseDow, International antitrust litigation: Conflict of laws and 
coordination, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2012.
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64. In this case too, the recourse to the regulations provided for by the regulations cannot fall 
within the scope of EU law even if those national provisions are to be used as a result of explicit or 
implicit recall of the regulations themselves130, when they refer to any aspect not provided for in the 
national law of the forum addressed131.
65. These instruments also contain rules that will be used to coordinate the procedures they 
have regulated with other procedures intended to be carried out according to national law. Thus accor-
ding to Regulation n. 1896/2006 the opposition to European order for payment determines the start of 
an ordinary civil proceeding. According to Regulation n. 861/2007 the sentence issued in a small-scale 
dispute is subject to an appeal based on the lex fori132, according to Regulation n. 655/2014 the order of 
attachment must be followed by the introduction of merit procedure133. In this case, too, it is necessary 
to ask whether these further proceedings governed by domestic law of member states and the national 
rules applicable to them fall due to the link with the respective uniform procedure within the scope of 
EU law and are therefore subject to CFREU standards.
66. Despite the fact that in all cases there is an undoubted connection between the proceedings 
governed by uniform legislation and those governed by national law, a differentiated response is pre-
ferable. Whilst the appeal of the sentence pronounced in the procedure provided for by Regulation no. 
861/2007 is nothing more than the natural continuation of the degree of judgment that has taken place 
according to the uniform rules, both the opposition to the European order for payment and the judgment 
of merit with respect to the European sequestration order open a completely new procedural phase dis-
tinct from the antecedent134. It seems logical to consider that, by limiting the right of EU to regulate the 
130  Referral to national law on the consequences of non-notification of a European order for payment in accordance with 
the minimum standards laid down in the Regulation n. 1896/2006 see from the CJEU joined cases joined cases joined cases 
C-119/13 and C-120/13, Eco Cosmetics GmH v. Virgine Laetitia Barbara Dupuy and Tetyana Bonchyk of 4 September 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144, parr. 45ss. Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006-creating a European order for payment procedure. See from 
the ECJ the next cases: C-508/12, Walter Vapenik v. Josef Thurner of 5 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:790, published 
in the electronic Reports of the cases; C-300/13, Imtech Marine Belgium NV v. Hellenic Radio SA of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:188, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, which the CJEU has declared that: “(...) certification is a 
measure of a judicial nature and is therefore reserved to the Court, and that is necessary to distinguish between the certification 
of a decision as the European enforcement order itself and the formal act of issuing the certificate and in particular the model 
contemplated by art. 9 of the rules of procedure (...)”. C-511/14, Pebros Servizi Srl v. Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd v. Aston Martin 
Lagonda Ltd of 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:448, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, which the CJEU has stated 
that: “(...) the default judgment was to be counted among the executive title that were to be certified as a European enforcement 
order, even if it could not, in fact, to be certified as a European enforcement order the pronouncement pronounced in absen-
tia when it was impossible to identify the domicile of the defendant also for the purposes of notification (...)”. And in case of 
monitor process see: C-144/12, Goldbet Sportwetten v. Massimo Sperindeo of 13 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:383; C-215/11, 
Iwona Szyrocka v. SiGer Technologie GmbH of 13 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:794; joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13, 
Eco Cosmetics GmH v. Virgine Laetitia Barbara Dupuy and Tetyana Bonchyk of 4 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144; 
C-245/14, Thomas Cook Belgium NV v. Thurner Hotel GmbH of 22 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:715; C-94/14, Flight Re-
fund Ltd vs. Deutsche Lufthansa AG of 10 March 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:148, the above cited cases published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases. For further analysis of the above cases see: M. Durovic, European law on unfair commercial practices and 
contract law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2016, pp. 106ss. M. hazeLhorst, Free movement of civil judgments 
in the European Union and the right of fair trial, ed. Springer, The Hague, 2017, pp. 438ss. T. rauscher, Internationales Priva-
trecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2017, pp. 686ss. F. eicheL, Keine rügelose Einlassung in Eu-
ropäischen Mahverfahren, in Revue de Droit Privè de L’Union Europèenne, 24, 2014. M. bobek, Central European judges under 
the European influence. The transformative power of the EU revisited, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 
234ss. P. gruber, Die Nichtgerklärung eines europäischen Zahlungsbbefehls, in Zeitschrift für das Privatrecht der Europäischen 
Union, 13 (1), 2016, pp. 153ss. W. JeLinek, S. zangL, Insolvenzordung, Manz Verlag, Wien, 2017.
131  In this sense from the CJEU, C-215/11, Szyrocka of 13 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:794, par. 34 with reference 
to court fees in the European order for payment procedure. See also: C-300/14, Imtech Marine Belgium of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:825, above published in the electronic Reports of the cases. According to which Regulation n. 805/2004 does 
not require the Member State to establish a review procedure for uncontested claims, but where the Member State establishes 
the procedure it must comply with the requirements of Union law.
132  CJEU, C-627/17, ZSE Energia of 22 November 2018; ECLI:EU:C:2018:941, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
133  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2017.
134  Thus the expression envisaged by art. 16 of the Regulation n. 1896/2006 on a mere complaint of credit, initiates an 
ordinary civil procedure and the injunction remains devoid of any effect.
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effects of the or non-opening of the new procedural step135, the performance of the latter must be consi-
dered extraneous to the scope of EU law and therefore of CFREU (unless you are attracted by reason of 
the link with the subject of the proceeding).
67. The identification of national rules that can be used for the implementation of these conflict 
rules using the parameter outlined in the Åkerberg Fransson judgment can be quite varied. In the first 
place, the national rules that are the subject of express reference in the regulations can certainly be qua-
lified in this sense. Among these may be reminded by way of example, the national rules that allow the 
choice of the law regulating divorce and personal separation during the course of the case, which may 
be detected pursuant to art. 5, par. 3 of Regulation no. 1259/2010136.
68. In this context, they can mainly detect national rules relating to general questions of private 
international law insofar as they remain applicable in the absence of a uniform solution provided for 
by the regulations pursuant to art. 81 TFEU137. Among these we can mention national rules on issues 
concerning positive and negative conflicts of citizenship for which a uniform solution does not seem to 
arise, as well as those relating to the verification of foreign law.
69. It is necessary to question the possibility that laws referred to in conflict rules should also 
be considered as relevant national rules for the implementation of EU law. A similar question is due to 
the particular formulation of the 16th recital of Regulation no. 1259/2010, in the matter of divorce and 
personal separation “the law chosen by the spouses must comply with the fundamental rights recognized 
by treaties and CFREU138. From this formulation it seems to be necessary to find that, in the opinion of 
the Board, the applicable material law may also be subjected to a check for compatibility with the requi-
rements of protection of fundamental rights. This would imply a much wider control than that allowed 
by the limit of public order since it could not only concern the law of the forum but would not be subor-
dinated to the confirmation of a manifest incompatibility as required by the provisions on public policy.
70. A similar conclusion based on a weak textual clue, which does not appear in other regu-
lations, appears to be excessively extensive. In this regard, it does not seem that the link between the 
conflict rules and the lex causae is the same as that described in the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, since 
it cannot be said that the applicable material law which may also belong to third-country laws is actually 
used to implement the rules of conflict of EU139. One followed the reasoning that seems to underlie the 
passage mentioned above in the preamble of Regulation no. 1259/2010 derives from the application of 
the conflict rules contained in the regulations pursuant to art. 81 TFEU an indiscriminate extension of 
the field of application of EU law (and of CFREU) to the solution, on the plane and material right, of all 
civil disputes that present an element of extraneousness. But this indication does not seem to be really 
compatible with the approach taken by the Court of Justice in delimiting that scope of application140.
71. It remains the possibility to examine the contrast of material right referred to by the conflict 
rules with the public order of the requested member state, whose content is inevitably also influenced 
135  As we can see in the case from the CJEU: C-144/12, Golbet Sportwetten of 13 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:393, pub-
lished in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 31ss. For further details and analysis see: D. acosta arcarazo, C.C. murphy, 
European Union security and justice law after Lisbon and Stockholm, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014.
136  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2017.
137  F. martucci, Droit de l’Union europèenne, op. cit.,
138  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2017. S. De vries, 
U. bernits, S. weatheriLL, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding instrument. Five years old and growing, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015.
139  On the other hand, the aforementioned recital refers exclusively to the law chosen by the parties and has no general scope. 
Also in light of the circumstance that no mechanism is foreseen in the provisions of the Regulation to supervise the compatibility 
check with CFREU, it should be considered that the mention is intended rather to draw attention to the possible risks of choosing 
law in a subject so sensitive.
140  CJEU, C-400/10 PPU, McB, of 5 October 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, I-08965.
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by CFREU norms or to apply specific provisions that require the judge to discard foreign laws that are 
contrary to the protection of certain fundamental rights141.
72. It is necessary to examine how the scope of EU law is articulated in the area of effectiveness 
of decisions, first of all taking into account the fact that the measures adopted so far only apply to the 
circulation of decisions between member states. For the moment, the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions by third states remain extraneous to the scope of Union law, with the sole exception of matters 
governed by international conventions concluded by the union itself or by member states in its interest142.
73. Also in this case, despite the fact that the regulations define in detail the procedures from 
time to time envisaged for the declaration of enforceability, for the main ascertainment of the absence 
of grounds impeding recognition for the refusal of recognition or enforcement and the rules of national 
procedures can be highlighted in relation to unregulated profiles143.
74. On the other hand, the regulation of enforcement procedures remains tended to be in the 
sphere of national law144 because following the declaration of enforceability or accompanied by the 
certificate in matters in which the exequatur was abolished, the sentence of another member state is 
entirely equivalent to a national judgment145. Since the regulations of EU provide a punctual guarantee 
for the effective enforcement of decisions coming from other member states, possibly after declaration 
of enforceability if national rules hinder its implementation and consequently the free circulation of 
decisions, the case could be included within the scope of EU law to the extent that the effectiveness of 
the latter is affected.
VII. Weighting between rights as a general interpretative criterion in civil judicial cooperation
75. If CFREU is applicable to the case under consideration in so far as it falls within the scope of 
application of EU law, the latter will be able to deploy the various functions described above from time 
to time. In the field of civil judicial cooperation, the impact of CFREU must be commensurate with the 
need to take into account the type of relationship affected by this competence of the EU, which corres-
pond to horizontal relations, inevitably subject to private law.
76. This is derived from the same definition of civil and commercial matters that are not found 
in art. 81 TFEU146 but CJEU jurisprudence has dealt with the interpretation of individual acts adopted 
by the union. In particular, this definition excludes the fiscal, customs and administrative matters and the 
141  See for example the art. 10 of Regulation n. 1259/2010 pursuant to which “(...) if the applicable law pursuant to Article 
5 or Article 8 does not provide for divorce or does not grant one of the spouses, because belonging to one or the other sex, equal 
access conditions to the divorce or the personal separation, the law of the forum applies (...)”. In the sense that the art. 10 applies 
automatically whenever the law referred to does not provide for divorce or does not allow equal access to separation or divorce.
142  In the sense that CJEU is not competent to interpolate international conventions concluded by the Member States 
as not belonging to EU law, except in the case where the latter was subsequently replaced by the Member States in the 
competence relating to the matter in which it was stipulated the Convention. See from the CJEU, C-533/08, TNT, Express 
Nederland of 4 May 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, I-04107, par. 59ss.
143  In the sense that the appeal aimed at challenging the declaration of enforceability pursuant to Regulation n. 44/2001 
although governed by national law constitutes implementation of Union law. CJEU, C-156/12, GREP of 13 June 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:342; C-322/14, El Majdoub of 3 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:334; C-297/14, Hobobm of 23 December 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:844; C-375/13, Kolassa of 28 Janaury 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37; C-548/12, Brogsitter of 13 March 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:148, all cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
144  CJEU, C-4/14, Bohez of 9 September 2015, ECLI:EU:2015:563, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 51
145  CJEU, C-139/10, Prism Investments of 13 October 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:653, I-09511, par. 40; C-148/84, Deutsche 
Genossenschaftbank of 2 July 1985, ECLI:EU:C:1985:280, I-01981, par. 18. For further details and analysis see: A. briggs, 
Civil jurisdiction and judgments, CRC Press, New York, 2015.
146  M. poiares maDuro, M. winD, The transformation of Europe: Twenty-five years on, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2017, pp. 321ss.
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matter of the responsibility of States for actions or omissions in the exercise of public powers. According 
to this logic, a case may be considered extraneous to civil matters when public authority is involved and 
this acts in the exercise of its power of authority147.
77. Now this does not result in significant consequences with respect to CFREU’s ability to pro-
duce direct effects. In fact, the provisions from which “norms capable of conferring rights to individuals” 
can be evinced are capable of producing direct effects both vertically and horizontally148; while those that 
do not have this feature will be unfit tout court to be included in the scheme of direct effectiveness and can 
only be detected on the interpretative level within the limits established by art. 52, par. 5 CFREU149.
78. But the very fact that the legal relations involved in civil judicial cooperation have a ho-
rizontal nature makes it clear that in the disputes submitted to the courts of member states there is an 
extraordinary phenomenon of competition between fundamental rights of the two opposing parties with 
the consequence that the criterion of fair balance is a recurring interpretative tool in this matter.
79. A similar approach is confirmed by the fact that in this ambit, the reference to art. 47 
CFREU150, which requires to take into account the overall scope of the principles expressed therein in 
relation to the structure of civil trial151, insofar as they guarantee, at the same time, plaintiff’s right to an 
effective remedy and defendant’s right to guarantee his defense.
80. Although this dual dimension of the principle does not seem to emerge from the indications 
expressed in articles 67 and 81 TFEU152, which emphasize on one side access to justice and on the other, 
the importance of circulation of decisions. CJEU has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of rights 
of defense and the need to take account of their equal importance.
81. In the jurisprudence there has been constant emergence since the rulings concerning Brus-
sels Convention, to the reference of the necessary reconciliation between the opposing needs to gua-
rantee a simplification of formalities connected to the exercise of the right of action and the circulation 
of decisions and to ensure the observance of rights of defense. This reconciliation does not necessarily 
follow pre-established formulas but must be carried out keeping in mind, on the one hand, the different 
structure of the individual acts and on the other the needs inherent to the specific case.
82. From the first point of view, the weighting between the right of the plaintiff for access to 
justice and of the defendant to effectively exercise his rights of defense is affected primarily by the aim 
pursued by individual measures.
83. With regard to service of judicial documents pursuant to Regulation n. 1393/2007 and the 
previous Regulation n. 1348/2000, CJEU has considered from its first decisions that the rights of defense 
of the recipient must be ensured153 without going so far as to effectively prevent the simplification of 
147  CJEU, C-645/11, Sapir and others of 11 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:228, par. 33; C-302/13, FlyLAL-Lithuanian Air-
lines of 23 October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319, par. 30, above the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
148  Expressly in the sense that the art. 47 CFREU is able to produce direct horizontal effects, in this case it was considered 
irrelevant that one of the parties was a third State, since it related to the subordinate employment relationship like an individual. 
A. sanger, State immunity and the right of access to a court under the EU Charter of Fundamental rights, in International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 65 (1), 2016, pp. 214ss.
149  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2017.
150  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, op. cit.,
151  On the other hand, it is to this structure that the values referring to their own needs and international judicial cooperation 
must be considered, on the basis of which the need to guarantee a flexibility of the right to a fair trial is prefigured, since in fact 
those needs do not constitute other than an emphasis on protecting the right to action in cross-border disputes.
152  A. mangas martìn, Tratado de la Uniòn Europea, Tratado de Funcionamiento, ed. Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2018.
153  CJEU, C-223/14, Tecom Mican SL and Arias Dominguez of 11 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:744, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases.
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formalities envisaged by the instrument or to place excessive burdens on the sender154. After the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, this reconstruction was consistently re-proposed, corroborating it with 
express references to CFREU.
84. Firstly, it has been established that the means of notification which provide only a legal 
presumption of knowledge without guaranteeing in any way the delivery of the deed to the addressee 
habitually resident in a different member state, are incompatible with the rights of defense155. Starting 
with the defense of Leffler of 8 November 2005156 CJEU has stated that if the respect of rights of defense 
and the right to the due process impose to allow the addressee to refuse an act not accompanied by its 
translation, would be incompatible with the objectives pursued by the Regulation to believe that such a 
lack cannot be remedied157. For the same reason CJEU comes to affirm that the effects of the amnesty are 
produced at different times for the sender and for the recipient158. After the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon CJEU has repeatedly stated that the use of the standard form provided for by the Regulation 
constitutes an essential formality to ensure respect for the rights of defense, as it allows the recipient to 
be aware of his right to refuse the act. But at the same time its omission does not imply the nullity of 
notification but the obligation to regularize it159.
85. A similar reasoning is carried out by CJEU with respect to the instruments designed to fa-
vor the free circulation of decisions, especially when it must assess, pursuant to art. 45 of Regulation 
n. 1215/2012, the existence of grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement based on failure to 
notify or notify the application. This impeding condition in the sense that the “regular” communication 
or notification of the introductory act was necessary in time for the defendant to prepare his defense160. 
With art. 34 of Regulation no. 44/2001 this condition of regularity of notification was suppressed with 
the consequence that the decision may not be recognized or performed in another member state only if 
it has not been communicated or notified to the defendant161 in time to present his defenses, except that 
even though he had the possibility, he did not challenge the decision162.
86. With the ASML judgment of 14 December 2006163 CJEU has clearly indicated the need to 
interpret this provision taking into account, at the same time, legislator’s decision to further expand the 
spaces for the circulation of decisions and the need not to excessively compress defendant’s right of 
defense. Therefore, in that judgment CJEU found that the defendant can rely on the ground for non-dis-
closure or notification of the application, whenever he, although aware of the existence of the decision, 
did not receive the communication or the notification and therefore could not challenge it.
154  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, op. cit.
155  CJEU, C-325/11, Alder of 19 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:824, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, 
par. 35.
156  CJEU, C-443/03, Leffler of 8 November 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:665, I-09611.
157  CJEU, C-443/03, Leffler of 8 November 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:665, I-09611, par. 42.
158  On the need for an interpretation inspired by a fair balance of the norms that allow the recipient to reject the act from the 
CJEU the case C-14/07, Weiss and Partner of 8 May 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:264 I-03367, according to which it is sufficient 
that the document introducing the judgment (and not also the supporting documents) are drafted in a language understandable 
to the addressee.
159  CJEU, C-519/13, Alpha Bank Cyprus of 16 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:603; C-354/15, Henderson of 2 March 
2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:157, par. 58, above published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
160  According to art. 27, n. 2 of the Convention see from the CJEU, C-49/84, Debaecker and Plouvier of 11 June 1985, 
ECLI:EU:C.1985:252, I-01779; C-522/03, Scania Finance France of 13 October 2005 of 13 October 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:606 
I-08639; C-3/05, Verdoliva of 16 February 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:113 I-01579.
161  See in argument from the CJEU: C-386/17, Liberato of 16 January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:24; C-308/17, Kuhn of 15 
November 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:911; C-296/17, Wiener & Trachte of 14 November 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:902; C-560/16, 
E.On Zurich Holding of 7 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:167; C-368/16, Assens Havn of 13 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:546; 
C-341/16, Hassen Beleggingen of 5 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:738, the cited cases was published in the electronic Re-
ports of the cases.
162  In the sense that the fact that the decision has been appealed precludes ex sè, if it is possible to assert this impeding 
cause, CJEU, C-420/07, Apostolides of 28 April 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, I-03571, par. 72.
163  CJEU, C-283/05, ASML of 14 December 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:787, I-12041.
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87. Based on the principles expressed in this ruling, in the subsequent rulings relative to this pro-
vision CJEU explicitly referred to the need to ensure a “fair balance” between the need for effectiveness 
linked to the principle of mutual recognition and the guarantee of mutual trust between states members 
and respect for the rights of the defense as protected by art. 47 CFREU164. This argumentative procedure 
was followed, to conclude that the requested member state judge is required to verify the notification 
of the document initiating proceedings in the member state of origin165 and that the defendant ca not be 
required to have challenged the decision if it becomes aware of it only after the time limit for proposing 
an expired appeal166.
88. Moreover, this reading focused on the rights of defense was explicitly re-proposed at ti-
mes with express reference to the need to respect art. 47 CFREU also with regard to instruments that 
provided for the abolition of exequatur, an even more radical simplification of the formalities required 
to guarantee circulation between member states167. Lack of control of the decision by the judge of the 
member state of enforcement imposes an even stricter guarantee of the rights of defense in the member 
state of origin168.
89. Precisely with reference to art. 34, n. 2 of Regulation n. 44/2001, this approach was essen-
tially considered also compatible with art. 6 of ECHR by ECtHR homologation in the aforementioned 
164  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, op. cit.,
165  CJEU, C-619/10, Trade Agency of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases.
166  CJEU, C-70/15, Lebek of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:524, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. In this case 
it was discussed the possibility of submitting a request to remove a foreclosure on the appeal pursuant to art. 19, par. 4 of Regu-
lation no. 1393/2007 (Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on 
the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, OJ L 324, 10.12.2007, p. 79-120), when the defendant had made aware 
of the decision only after the expiry of the deadline established under the Regulation to request the removal of the foreclosure.
167  See from the Regulation n. 805/2004, CJEU, C-300/14, Imtech Marine Belgium of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:825; C-511/14, Pebros Servizi of 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:448. According to the Regulation n. 
1896/2006 (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006-creating a European order for payment procedure) see the next cases from the 
CJEU: joined cases C-119 and C-120/13, Eco Cosmetics of 4 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144, parr. 45ss; C-245/14, 
Thomas Cook Belgium of 22 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:715, par. 41; C-94/14, Flight refund of 10 March 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C.2016:148, par. 59; C-508/12, Walter Vapenik v. Josef Thurner of 5 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:790, pub-
lished in the electronic Reports of the cases; C-300/13, Imtech Marine Belgium NV v. Hellenic Radio SA of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:188, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, which the CJEU has declared that: “(...) certification 
is a measure of a judicial nature and is therefore reserved to the Court, and that is necessary to distinguish between the certifi-
cation of a decision as the European enforcement order itself and the formal act of issuing the certificate and in particular the 
model contemplated by art. 9 of the rules of procedure (...)”. See also the case: C-511/14, Pebros Servizi Srl v. Aston Martin 
Lagonda Ltd v. Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd of 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:448, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases , which the CJEU has stated that: “(...) the default judgment was to be counted among the executive title that were to 
be certified as a European enforcement order, even if it could not, in fact, to be certified as a European enforcement order the 
pronouncement pronounced in absentia when it was impossible to identify the domicile of the defendant also for the purposes 
of notification (...)”. And in case of monitor process see: C-133/12, Goldbet Sportwetten v. Massimo Sperindeo of 13 June 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105; C-215/11, Iwona Szyrocka v. SiGer Technologie GmbH of 13 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:794; 
joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13, Eco Cosmetics GmH v. Virgine Laetitia Barbara Dupuy and Tetyana Bonchyk of 4 
September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144; C-245/14, Thomas Cook Belgium NV v. Thurner Hotel GmbH of 22 October 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:715; C-94/14, Flight Refund Ltd vs. Deutsche Lufthansa AG of 10 March 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:148, the 
above cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For the analysis of the above cases see: M. Durovic, Euro-
pean law on unfair commercial practices and contract law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2016, pp. 106ss. M. 
hazeLhorst, Free movement of civil judgments in the European Union and the right of fair trial, ed. Springer, The Hague, 2017, 
pp. 438ss. T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, op. cit., pp. 686ss. F. eicheL, Keine rü-
gelose Einlassung in Europäischen Mahverfahren, in Revue de Droit Privè de L’Union Europèenne, 24, 2014. M. bobek, Cen-
tral European judges under the European influence. The transformative power of the EU revisited, Hart Publishing, Oxford & 
Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 234ss. P. gruber, Die Nichtgerklärung eines europäischen Zahlungsbbefehls, in Zeitschrift für das 
Privatrecht der Europäischen Union, 13 (1), 2016, pp. 153ss. W. JeLinek, S. zangL, Insolvenzordung, Manz Verlag, Wien, 2017.
168  CJEU, C-289/17, Collect Inkasso of 28 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:133, published in the electronic Reports of 
the cases.
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Avotinš v. Latvia case169. In that judgment, while drawing attention to the fact that a purely mechanical 
application of the rules on circulation of judgments could lead to violations of fundamental rights and 
the need to provide mechanisms to ensure that the judge of the requested state has the power to verify 
whether or not there is such violations170. ECtHR has finally recognized the need to ensure a balance 
between the safeguards provided for the defendant and the need for the circulation of decisions, which 
require the defendant to avail himself of the remedies provided in the member state of origin.
90. Precisely because there are no preconceived formulas to ensure a proper balance between 
the different components of the right to effective judicial protection it is possible that both in jurispru-
dence and legislative acts, different ways of reconciling the right of the plaintiff to access justice and to 
agreed to a fair trial.
91. CJEU’s rulings have revealed the need to ensure a certain prevalence of the right to action 
where the notification of the document introducing the trial is made impossible by the latter’s unrepeata-
bility. CJEU found itself examining a case of this kind in the Hypot ni Banka sentence of 17 November 
2011171 in which it also held that in relation to contracts concluded with consumers and in spite of the 
protection conferred on them by Regulation no. 44/2001 an action can be promoted against a consumer 
whose current address is unknown to the judge of the place of the last known domicile provided that 
all the necessary research to identify the new domicile has been carried out. To reach this conclusion, 
CJEU referring to art. 47 CFREU referred to the purpose of “reinforcing the legal protection of persons 
established in the Union” and the need to respect the right of the plaintiff to appeal to a judge to deter-
mine the validity of his claims “and acknowledged that in such circumstances it is possible impose a 
limitation on the defendant’s rights of defense to avoid a clear denial of justice against the plaintiff172.
92. This principle was reiterated in the subsequent G v. Cornelius de Visser sentence of 15 
March 2012173, in which CJEU acknowledged that the notification of an application can also be made 
by means of a bill posting notification expressly referring to a ruling by ECtHR which considered this 
notification method compatible with art. 6 of ECHR174 and reiterating that the defendant is in any case 
open to the possibility of subsequently opposing the recognition and enforcement of the decision if the 
application was not notified to him.
93. In a logic of evaluation of the concrete case in the subsequent sentence A v. B of 11 Sep-
tember 2014 CJEU has examined a case in which the defendant was found a curator in absentia and 
the plaintiff invoked the non-contestation of jurisdiction by the latter and therefore the tacit extension 
of jurisdiction in favor of the court seised. In these circumstances it was expressly stated that such a 
possibility was wholly unsuitable to establish the right balance between the right to an effective remedy 
169  D. LiakopouLos, Protection of human rights between European Court of Human Rights and Court of European Union, 
in International and European Union Legal Matters, 2015.
170  See for further details see: F. ait-ouyahia, Les mècanismes de reconnaissance mutuelle dans l’Unione europèenne à 
l’èpreuve du droit à un procès èquitable à propos de l’arrêt Avotins v. Lettonie, in Cahiers de Droit Europèenne, 52 (3), 2016, 
pp. 978ss.
171  CJEU, C-327/10, Hypote nì Banka of 17 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:745, I-0000.
172  The CJEU also states that in the absence of notification of the application initiating the proceedings, the defendant is 
without prejudice to the right to object to the recognition of the decision on the basis of Article 34, n. 2 of the Regulation n. 
44/2001 while the plaintiff would remain without any means of appeal (paragraph 54).
173  CJEU, C-292/10, G v. Cornelius de Visser of 15 March 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:142, published in the electronic Reports 
of the cases. In this case it was considered possible to establish jurisdiction based on the forum of non-contractual liability 
provided for at the time under art. 5, n. 3 of Regulation n. 44/2001.
174  ECtHR, Nunes Dias v. Portugal of 10 April 2003. For further details and analysis see: B. rainey, W. wicks, C. ovey, 
Jacbos, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. J.P. costa, La 
Cour europèenne des droits de l’homme. Des juges pour la libertè, ed. Dalloz, Paris. 2017. f. timmermans, Fundamental rights 
protection in Europe before and after accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, in Liber 
amicorum Pieter Van Dijk, M. Van Roosmalen and others (eds.), Intersentia, Antwerp, Oxford, 2013, pp. 225ss. D. harris, M. 
o’boyLe, C. warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 372ss.
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and the rights of the defense”, since the defendant could not be considered validly represented by the 
appointed curator, whom he had not conferred a mandate and could not be considered a summation of 
the relevant defendant for the purposes of the formation of the tacit extension175.
94. A clear prevalence of the right to an effective appeal is found in those provisions of regu-
lations of ex art. 81 TFEU176 which allow recourse to the necessity court. According to the formulation 
of the provision used for the first time in art. 7 of Regulation no. 4/2009 and repeated later in art. 11 of 
Regulation n. 650/2012 and also in art. 11 of the “twin” regulations 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 “(...) in 
exceptional cases the courts of a member state may be aware of the dispute if the proceeding cannot 
reasonably be brought or carried out or it proves impossible in a third state with which the dispute has 
a close connection. The dispute must present a sufficient connection with the member state of the court 
seised (...)”177.
95. This institute outlined by the internal law or the jurisprudential practice of some member 
states appears once again inspired by concerns related to the right to effective judicial protection, sin-
ce it prefigures a situation in which despite the dispute being closely connected with a third state, the 
judgment it may take place in a member state with which there is a “sufficient connection”178. From the 
impossibility of introducing the judgment in the third state, and therefore as a guarantee of the right of 
the plaintiff to an effective appeal, the rule to derive an autonomous title of jurisdiction, certainly dero-
gating from the principle of predictability of the defendant’s court and therefore abstractly susceptible 
to compress the rights of defense of the latter, insofar as the action is proposed in a member state with 
which he does not present significant connections. But once again on the rights of defense is the need to 
avoid a denial of justice against the actor that the institutions show they want to derive from article. 47 
CFREU179 as well as the precise indications of art. 67, par. 4 TFEU180, although without being conside-
red clearly obliged, was to introduce the necessity forum in all the instruments related to civil judicial 
cooperation181 as shown by the approach followed in the approval of Regulation no. 1215/2012.
96. In a broader context, the regulations offer variable balancing formulas between the opposing 
needs of the plaintiff and the defendant, even though they are connected to the right to effective judicial 
protection, where they modulate the rules of jurisdiction according to different parameters. In this sense 
the general approach seems to be that established on the basis of Regulation architecture n. 1215/2012, 
according to which, in determining jurisdiction, defendant’s defensive needs must first be taken into 
account by ensuring that he is sued before a foreseeable forum182.
175  It is not clear from the aforementioned ruling whether the CJEU intended to raise doubts as to whether the defendant, 
when considered non-contumacious for the purposes of the tacit extension, could object to the recognition and enforcement of 
the sentence issued at the end of the proceedings. However, this risk had to be considered excluded in the light of the previous 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, as we can see from the case C-78/95, Hendrikman and Feyen v. Magenta Druck & Verlag of 20 
October 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:380, I-04943, moreover expressly mentioned in the case: A v. B. for a case similar to Regula-
tion n. 2201/2003 see from the CJEU the case: C-215/15, Gogova of 21 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:710, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases.
176  M. poiares maDuro, M. winD, The transformation of Europe: Twenty-five years on, op. cit.,
177  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, op. cit.
178  On the compatibility of the analogous criterion foreseen by the art. 3 of the Swiss law of private international law with 
the art. 6 of the Convention see from the ECtHR the sentence of Naït Liman v. Switzerland of 15 March 2018, par. 208ss, where 
it is also highlighted the similarity of the norm to the Swiss law with that contained in the regulations of the Union. For the 
improper nature of the actual link between the dispute and the court seised pursuant to art. 5 of the ECHR see also the case from 
the ECtHR Arlewein v. Sweden of 1st March 2016, par. 63ss. D. LiakopouLos, Protection of human rights between European 
Court of Human Rights and Court of European Union, in International and European Union Legal Matters, 2015
179  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, op. cit.,
180  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, op. cit.
181  In the sense that an obligation in this sense does not derive neither from customary law nor from contractual norms 
according the case of the ECtHR in sentence of Naït Liman v. Switzerland of 15 March 2018.
182  T. rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht mit internationalem Verfahrensrecht, op. cit.
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97. The balancing of the guarantee of the rights of defense with the right of the plaintiff to an 
effective appeal can lead to different outcomes whenever the latter right is combined with other relevant 
values that are abstractly traceable to the protection of other fundamental rights provided by CFREU. A 
clear example is found first of all in Regulation n. 1215/2012, where it admits that this general architec-
ture should be set aside in the presence of requirements related to the protection of the weak contractor 
and identifies insurance contracts183, concluded with consumers and individual contracts for subordinate 
employment, a discipline exhaustive, based on these requirements, which are undoubtedly their founda-
tion, as well as in Treaties and in article 38 of CFREU on consumer protection and in articles 30 and 31 
of the same on the subject of working conditions184.
98. On the other hand, similar requirements of the weak party emerge in the determination of 
jurisdiction in matters of maintenance obligations in family185 on the basis of Regulation no. 4/2009, as 
stated in the 15th recital of the Regulation, the jurisdiction rules laid down therein are inspired by the 
principle of favor creditoris186, whose implementation is moreover linked to the protection of the right to 
private and family life guaranteed by art. 7 of CFREU187 and therefore oriented to ensure a broad access 
to justice by the creditor of food. In the same vein, the rules on jurisdiction of Regulation no. 2201/2003, 
which are designed in broad terms to realize the interests of the spouses in relation to the needs related 
to the mobility of persons188 and consequently provide a plurality of alternative forums, are intended 
to favor the plaintiff’s right to an effective appeal as it with the need to protect the right to private and 
family life according to ECtHR Babiarz v. Poland case of 10 January 2017189.
99. The need for weighting between different rights of jurisdiction rules contained in the same 
Regulation no. 2201/2003 and relating to parental responsibility, which appear clearly oriented to pursue 
an objective of protection of fundamental rights of the child that can be derived from art. 24 CFREU 
which requires the primary interest of child to be considered pre-eminent190.
100. Not only this last principle is expressly referred to as a necessary evaluation parameter in 
the provisions of Regulation191 but above all CJEU jurisprudence has clarified that it is responsible for 
the centrality of the jurisdiction based on the habitual residence of the minor, as the nearest judge is 
also what is in the most favorable position to evaluate the measures to be taken192. From this CJEU has 
also obtained the consequence that it must be interpreted restrictively any other rule on the jurisdiction 
contained in Regulation193, precisely because the subjective positions of the high parties involved even if 
183  CJEU, C-249/16, Kareda of 15 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:472; C-29/16, Hanse Yachts of 4 May 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:343; C-24/16, Nintendo of 27 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:724; C-230/15, Brite Strike Technologies 
of 14 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:560, the above cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
184  K. stern, M. sachs, Europäische Grundrecht Charta, ed. C.H. Beck, München, 2016.
185  CJEU, C-295/95, Farrell v. Long of 20 March 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:168, I-01683.
186  CJEU, C-499/15, Wand V. of 15 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:118, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
187  In this regard, the orientation of the ECtHR according to which the successors rights are so intimately connected to the 
family bonds that fall within the sphere of application of art. 8 of the ECHR according to the sentence Marckx v. Belgium of 13 
June 1979, parr. 51-52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra of 13 July 2004, par. 26. D. LiakopouLos, La volonté de la Cour de justice 
de privilégier la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme dans sa protection des droits fondamentaux, in International 
and European Union Legal Matters-working paper series, 2012.
188  CJEU, C-294/15, Mikoŀajczyk of 13 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:772, not yet published, par. 50.
189  D. harris, M. o’boyLe, C. warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human rights, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2014.
190  CJEU, C-372/16, Sahyouni of 20 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:988, published in the electronic Reports of the cases
191  See in particular the articles 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, regarding the extension of competence and the art. 15, paragraphs 
1 and 5, on the transfer of jurisdiction to a court which is more suitable for dealing with the case.
192  CJEU, C-256/09, Purrucker of 15 July 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2015:437, I-07353, par. 91; C-499/15, W. and V. of 15 Feb-
ruary 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:118, par. 51; C-111/17 PPU, OL of 8 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436, par. 63, the above cited 
cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
193  With respect to the extension of jurisdiction pursuant to art. 12 of the Regulation see from the CJEU the case: C-215/15, 
Gogova of 21 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:710, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. par. 41; with respect to 
the transfer to a judge more suited to dealing with the case pursuant to art. 15 of Regulation according to the sentence of the 
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attributable to the protection of other fundamental rights such as the right of parents to family life, they 
can never determine any weakening of the rights of the child.
VIII. Interpretation of EU and national rules in accordance with CFREU on civil judicial coope-
ration
101. The examination of CJEU jurisprudence clearly shows that the technique of logical-sys-
tematic interpretation of secondary law in accordance with CFREU is also widely used in the field of 
civil judicial cooperation, as JEU has repeatedly referred to the provisions of CFREU for identify the 
meaning to be attributed to concepts used in the regulations pursuant to art. 81 TFEU194.
102. In McB case of 5 October 2010 it was considered that pursuant to art. 2, n. 11 of Regulation 
n. 2201/2003 the transfer of a minor can be considered illegal only if it takes place in violation of a right 
of custody conferred by the applicable national law which in the present case attributed it in the couples 
not to officially associate to the mother and only following a possible judicial decision also to the father. 
CJEU, after declaring its intention to limit its analysis to the Regulation standard without evaluating the 
applicable national law (which was outside the scope of Union law), examined the compatibility of the 
notion of “illegal transfer” identified on the basis of the rules applicable internal (and therefore at least 
indirectly also the latter) with reference to articles 7 and 24 CFREU. Based on this analysis, also conduc-
ted on the basis of the jurisprudence of ECtHR in relation to the right to private and family life protected 
by art. 8 of ECHR concluded that the above interpretation did not conflict with art. 7 CFREU195, since it 
was in any case allowed to the father even without the consent of the mother, to obtain a right of custody 
on the basis of a judicial decision; nor with art. 24, because the attribution of the right of custody by the 
judge makes it possible to ascertain whether it is in the best interests of the minor.
103. This ruling is of particular interest as it provides confirmation of the use of various mecha-
nisms relating to the implementation of CFREU discussed above on the general plan. On the one hand, 
the ruling is concerned with ascertaining the compatibility of the interpretation of the act of secondary 
legislation with the rules of CFREU196. On the other hand, it identifies which parameters relevant to this 
purpose are not only a provision of CFREU expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Regulation (arti-
cle 24) but also as logical due to the hierarchical prevalence of CFREU, a different provision197, evoked 
by the referring court. For a further verse makes use of the equivalence clause contained in art. 52, par. 
3 CFREU, making explicit recourse to the jurisprudence of ECtHR.
104. In some cases the logical-systematic interpretation has led CJEU to prescribe an interpreta-
tion of regulations not immediately evident from the textual content of their provisions.
105. Of this possibility CJEU has repeatedly made use with reference to art. 24 CFREU and 
the consequent need to guarantee the best interests of the minor, since these are parameters expressly 
referred to in the preamble of Regulation no. 2201/2003. It affirmed that a provisional or precautionary 
CJEU C-428/15, D. (Child and Family Agency) of 27 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:819, published in the electronic Reports 
of the cases, par. 48.
194  M. poiares maDuro, M. winD, The transformation of Europe: Twenty-five years on, op. cit.,
195  D. harris, M. o’boyLe, C. warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human rights, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014. C. grabenwarter, European Convention on human rights: ECHR, C.H. Beck, München, 2014. J. meyer (ed.), 
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
196  In the same spirit from the CJEU, C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, 
I-14247, parr. 60ss.
197  For a reference to the art. 6 ECHR on the right to freedom in the case of cross-border placement of the minor in an insti-
tution see the sentence of the CJEU, C-92/12 PPU, Health Service Executive of 26 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:255, published 
in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 11. D. LiakopouLos, The best interests of the child between European and international 
private law rules: Unification and evolution of child protection, in Juris Gradibus-working paper series, 2014.
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measure adopted by a judge not responsible for the merit cannot affect the custody of the minor198. It has 
established that the appeal against the declaration of enforceability of a decision regarding parental res-
ponsibility has no suspensive effect199; he considered that he could not speak of “illicit failure to return” 
when a child was born by express will of the parents, in a particular member state in which he has the 
habitual residence of parents, even if the common residence of parents was before birth in a different 
member state in which the child was not transferred as initially agreed, and excluded that this could find 
an obstacle in child’s right to entertain personal relationships with both parents200.
106. On the other hand, the use of art. 24 CFREU also occurred with reference to regulations 
that did not mention it explicitly. CJEU has ruled that an application for food in favor of a minor can be 
submitted pursuant to art. 3, lett. c) of Regulation no. 4/2009 to the jurisdiction of the member state in 
which a divorce or separation between the parents is taking place201.
107. The right to effective judicial protection has also frequently been used by CJEU to interpret re-
gulations on civil judicial cooperation. In doing so CJEU has especially favored the perspective of weighting 
between conflicting rights, implicit in the structure of art. 47 CFREU and the consequent search for the 
right balance. On this basis CJEU has repeatedly interpreted the concepts used in the regulations pursuant 
to art. 81 TFEU in line with the requirements of effective judicial protection. Thus the notion of “review 
procedure” used in Regulation no. 805/2005202 or the methods for informing the recipient of a notification 
on the right to refuse the document203 have been reconstructed based on the parameter of art. 47 CFREU204.
108. Furthermore, it may be added that even on a more limited group of cases CJEU has deemed 
possible to recall the norms of CFREU also with reference to the national rules used for the implemen-
tation of EU law by proposing a specific interpretation205 or imposing its application206.
IX.Use of CFREU rules for the interpretation of general concepts of private international law
109. The emergence of the theme of protection of fundamental rights in the system of Brussels 
Convention of 1968 took place with the Krombach sentence with reference to the interpretation of the 
198  CJEU, C-403/09, Detiček of 23 December 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:810, I-12193, parr. 53ss. For further details and anal-
ysis see: V. trstenJak, P. weingerL, The influence of human rights and basic rights in private law, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2015.
199  CJEU, C-92/12 PPU, Health Service Executive of 26 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:255, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases, par. 124.
200  CJEU, C-111/17 PPU, OL of 8 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, parr. 
36ss.
201  CJEU, C-184/14, A. of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:479, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 46.
202  CJEU, C-300/14, Imtech Marine Belgium of 17 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:825, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases, par. 38
203  CJEU, C-519/13, Alpha Bank Cyprus of 16 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:603, par. 35; C-384/14, Alta Realitat 
of 28 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:316, the above cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases par. 48ss.
204  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, op. cit.,
205  In particular from the CJEU in case C-519/13, Alpha Bank Cyprus of 16 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:603, the 
powers of the national judge in relation to the refusal were reconstructed according to parameters related to effective judicial 
protection to receive the notification of an act. See also in the same spirit the case C-498/14 PPU, Bradbrooke of 9 January 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:3, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, in which the national legislation which attributed 
the jurisdiction to a specialized legal authority on the direct projections to to judge on the return or on the custody of a minor 
has been deemed compliant with the art. 24 CFREU, as it is considered to be respectful of the speed of the procedure require-
ment. See also the case: C-184/14, A. of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:479, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, 
in which the national legislation concerning the appointment of a trustee in absentia has been interpreted as meaning that the 
latter can not express the will of the person represented in particular for of the tacit extension of justification.
206  CJEU, C-354/15, Henderson of 2 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:157; C-21/17, Catlin Europe of 6 September 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:675, above the cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases, in which a national Regulation 
that considered nothing to be a notification for non-delivery of the standard form required by Regulation no. 1393/2007 was 
considered incompatible with the Regulation itself in relation to the principles derived from art. 47 CFREU.
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notion of public order as a cause impeding the recognition of decisions. Now the interpretation of the no-
tion of public order in the light of the protection of fundamental rights has been urged to CJEU already 
on two occasions after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
110. In Trade Agency case207 the preliminary ruling was considered contrary to public order, ie 
it does not specify the subject of the request or the reasons to be founded by the judge. In particular, the 
national court assumed that a decision with such characteristics was contrary to the right to a fair trial.
111. In examining these arguments, CJUE stated that it would not be the case to identify the 
content of the concept of public order of the requested member state, but only to define the limits of 
the use of this concept. It has thus held that only the manifest and immense violation of a fundamental 
right208, such as the right to a fair trial guaranteed by art. 47 CFREU209,could justify the non-recogni-
tion of a decision by contrast with the public order and then examined whether in the present case, a 
manifest and disproportionate violation could be referred to the examination of certain profiles to the 
referring court.
207  CJEU, C-619/10, Trade Agency of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases.
208  Already with reference to the 1968 Brussels Convention, the CJEU had lastly referred to the citation note of a manifest 
and immense “violation” of a fundamental right, based on the exceptional nature of the limit of public order. See in the same 
spirit the case. CJEU, C-394/07, Gambazzi of 2 April 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:219, I-02563, par. 33. The English procedural 
law opens up, to be true, a rather unhelpful remedy for the unsuccessful party sentenced to be default and which does not appear 
in line with art. 47 CFREU. This is the application to set aside, provided for by Rule 13 CPR, whose acceptance requires the 
demonstration of a realistic prospect of resisting the demand (Godwin v. Swindon BC 82001) 4 ER 641, for May Lj; Akram v. 
Adam 820049 EWCA Civ. 1601; ED & F may prodcuts ltd v. Patel & Anr, 82003), EWCA Civ. 472, Potter LJ; Bond v. Dunster 
Proparties Ltd (2011) EWCA Civ 455, par. 4; English Reimbold & Strick Ltd (200) EWCA Civ 605; (2002) 1 WLR 2409, CA, 
par. 12; Privy Council decisions Attorney-General v. Universal Projects Limited (2011) UKPC 37 and Attorney v. Matthews 
(2011) UKPC 38; International Company Ltd v Natsionalna Aktsionerna Kompaniia Naftogaz (2012) EWCA Civ 196, par. 
78 (with the relevant comment: M. ahmeD, Setting aside judgment in default, article 6 of the ECHR and the principle of res 
judicata, in Civil Justice Quarterly, 30, 2012, pp. 418ss) Standard bank Plc v. Sgrivest International inc., 82010, EWCA Civ. 
1400, moore-bick LK; Wightman v. Wiffrigton (succession de), 2007, QCCA 1687 (CanLII) (2008) of 5 December 2008, parr. 
5-8; Castor Holding Ltd. (Sundic de), 2008 QCCS 3437 (CanII), (2008), R.J.Q. 2207 of 30 July 2008; Queen’s Bench Division, 
Commercial Court, in case of 20 December 2007 (2007) EWHC 23010 (Comm), Masri v. Consolidated Contractors Interna-
tional Co Sal. And for practical applications see also: Babanaft International v. Bassatne (1989) 2 WLR 232); Republic of Haiti 
v. Duvalier (1989) 2 WLR 261; Derby & Co v. Weldon (n.1) (1989) 2 (WLR 276). In case Summers v. Fairclough Homes Ltd 
2012 UKSC 26, ar. 377 was noted that: “(...) court has a wide discretion as to how to exercise its case management powers. 
These include the poer to strike out the whole or any part of a statement of case at whatever stage it is made, even if it is made 
at the end of the trial. However the cases stress the flexibility of the CPR (...)”. The imposition of unnatural and higher charges 
and probative standards for the default, than would be for the defendant constituted. The limitation of the right to the trial of the 
default; the absence of judgment, if not indirectly, as a reflection of the validity of the impedimental, amending, extinctive facts 
deduced from the dispute, on the constituting facts of the right asserted by the plaintiff and the discretionality of the return in 
the defensive powers of the involuntary default make this remedy a blunt weapon. For further details see: A. zuckerman, Rule 
making and precedent under the civil procedure rules 1998-still an unsettled field, in Civil Justice Quarterly, 28, 2010, pp. 14ss. 
J. harris, L. coLLins, Dicey, Morris & Collins, The conflict of laws, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2017, pp. 13ss: “(...) the general 
principle (is) that in England service of process is the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a claim in personam 
(...) when process cannot legally be served upon a defendant, the court can exercise no jurisdiction over him[. T]he converse 
of this statement holds good, and whenever a defendant can be legally served with process, then the court, on service being 
effected, has jurisdiction to entertain a claim against him. Hence in proceedings in personam (...) the rules as to service define 
the limits of the court’s jurisdiction (...) in continental countries (...) service of process is often required to give the defendant 
notice of proceedings, but it does not create jurisdiction; jurisdiction must exist already before a writ can be served (the most 
common basis of jurisdiction being the habitual residence of the defendant) (...)”. N. anDrews, Civil procedure, in A. burrows 
(ed.), English private law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, chapter 22: “(...) the order without notifying the respondent 
without notice or ex parte its essence is a surprise procedural strike (...)”. S. sime, A practical approach to civil procedure, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 474ss. A. zuckerman, Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2013, pp. 502ss. S. shetreet, The cultural of judicial independence: rule of law and world peace, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
The Hague, 2014. G. guniberti, Debarment from defending, default judgments and public policy, in Praxis des internationalen 
Privat-und Verfahrensrechts, 30 (9), 2010, pp. 148ss.
209  C. mak, Rights and remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and effective judicial protection in European private law matters, op. 
cit., G. Lebrun, De l’utilitè de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’union europèenne, op. cit.,
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112. In the Meroni sentence of 25 May 2016210 the question referred for a preliminary ruling 
concerned the possible incompatibility of a decision capable of infringing the rights of persons who did 
not intervene in the proceedings with the public order, once again subject to the right to a fair trial. CJEU 
after having recalled the premises already carried out in the Trade Agency case and having clarified that 
CFREU rules in the light of the principle elaborated in Åkerberg Fransson ruling could be relevant to 
the reconstruction of the concept of public policy, concluded that in the present case there was a manifest 
and disproportionate violation of the right to a fair trial because third parties affected by the decision 
could appeal for its modification or its annulment.
113. These decisions provide a useful framework for understanding the functioning of CFREU 
rules for the reconstruction of general concepts of private international law. It should first be noted that 
CJEU has, despite its initial premise, reconstructed in detail if the notion of public order could be in-
voked in the two cases, examining the relevant circumstances in a precise and detailed manner. But this 
reconstruction seems understandable in the light of the ways in which the very notion of public order has 
been interpreted by CJEU, which has expressly considered that CFREU rules can contribute to delineate 
this notion, this conclusion is consistent with the premise that CFREU is now part of the primary law of 
EU and identifies rules of fundamental importance within the latter system. Since, as the norms of EU 
law211 can constitute a component of public order of the individual member states, obviously the norms 
of CFREU must be considered suitable to influence the content of public order. To the extent that the in-
terpretation of the notion of public order presupposes in turn the interpretation of art. 47 CFREU212 (but 
possibly also of such provisions of the same) this operation undoubtedly falls within the competence of 
CJEU for preliminary rulings.
114. The two judgments just mentioned acknowledge that the principles expressed by CFREU, 
in consideration of their position in EU also in relation to their purpose, can detect in order to reconstruct 
the concept of public order as a cause impeding the recognition of decisions, but because of the structu-
ral equivalence between the two concepts, even as a limit to the application of foreign law.
115. In these cases CJEU has come to the conclusion that the violation of the fundamental right 
to the fair trial does not have the necessary characteristics to transmit in an incompatibility with public 
order, evidently starting from the premise of the exceptional nature of this limit213. It could doubt such 
a reconstruction, as it determines a “weakened” application of CFREU, which is emphasized not in the 
presence of any violation, but only when it is classified as “manifest and immense”.
116. It does not seem to be in actual fact contrary to the principles relating to the application 
of CFREU when it is considered that, in the hypothesis considered, this application is essentially par 
ricochet, according to a scheme already outlined with respect to ECHR. The principles relating to the 
protection of fundamental rights, as recognized in EU law, are relevant to what is relevant here, only at 
the stage of recognition and enforcement of decisions, in which it is clearly acceptable under the princi-
ple of mutual trust, which underlies the system of civil judicial cooperation that control over respect for 
fundamental rights is limited214.
117. Two distinct hypotheses can occur. In a first hypothesis, if the relevant rules for the dispute 
in the member state of origin are extraneous to the scope of EU law, CFREU cannot be applied in the 
210  C-559/14, Meroni of 25 May 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:349, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 38.
211  I. baseDow, Recherches sur la fonction de l’ordre public europèen dans la jurisprudence, in Mèlanges en l’honneur de 
Paul Lagarde, Dalloz, Paris, 2005, pp. 37ss. S. pfeiff, La portabolitè de statute personnel dans l’espace europèen, ed. Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 2017.
212  J. meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
213  In this spirit see from the CJEU the case C-145/86, Hoffman of 4 February 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, I-00645, par. 21. 
C-420/07, Apostolides of 28 April 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, I-03571.
214  For a statement to this effect in the scope of the Regulation n. 2201/2003 see the case from the CJEU: C-455/15 PPU, P 
v. Q of 19 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
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member state of origin. On the other hand, the requested member state is not directly imposing the in-
fringement of CFREU but only by implementing the decision based on incorrect application of CFREU 
and therefore is reasonable that its power of control is limited to exceptional circumstances.
118. On the other hand, even if the norms relevant to the dispute in the member state of origin 
fell within the scope of EU law, it was for that state to ensure that the protection of fundamental rights 
was guaranteed in the proceedings before its courts. CJEU has already stated in the past that in the re-
cognition of a declaration of enforceability of a foreign decision by the requested member state, even 
if the judge of the latter considers that a rule of EU law has been infringed, he can take into account 
for the purpose of the ground for public order, only the manifest violation of a rule of law considered 
essential215. This principle should apply where the exequatur procedure has been abolished and only a 
procedure for monitoring the foreign decision of a potential nature is envisaged.
119. It remains to be added that this mechanism appears in reality also consistent with the prin-
ciples indicated by ECtHR in the aforementioned Avotinš v. Latvia case216 in which it was established 
that EU member states must also retain the power to exercise control over foreign decisions “(...) if a 
serious and substantiated complaint is raised before (domestic courts) to the effect that the protection of 
a convention right has been deficient (...)”217. With respect to this international obligation, the limits of 
admissibility to the public order clause as outlined by the jurisprudence described above appear subs-
tantially consistent, while difficulties could arise in the application of those instruments of the Union in 
the field of civil judicial cooperation which, like the regulations no. 2201/2003, 805/2004 and 4/2009 no 
longer provide for control of foreign decisions in terms of compatibility with public order218.
120. A different conclusion could arise only in the presence of the violation of a right of an abso-
lute nature, such as those related to the protection of human dignity and therefore such as not to tolerate 
any kind of derogation from member states. In such an hypothesis, which appears to be improbable at 
least in the relations between member states of the union, it might be imposed to the required state to 
exercise more precise control, since the circulation of a decision capable of infringing a fundamental 
right having an imperative nature cannot be admitted.
121. The impact of CFREU on the general categories of private and procedural international law 
does not seem to be limited to public order clause, since other concepts of indeterminate content can be 
influenced, in their concrete reconstruction, by the need to take into account the requirements related to 
the protection of fundamental rights.
215  CJEU, C-38/98, Renault of 11 May 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, I-02973; C-302/13, FlyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines of 23 
October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319; C-681/13, Diageo Brands of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, par. 48, the above 
cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
216  The reasoning of the ECtHR is not, at this point, completely clear. Referring in particular to the possibility of overcom-
ing (instead of not applying) the presumption of equivalence, it seems that the examination of the judges of Strasbourg con-
tinues to have as object the compatibility of the system of circulation of judgments referred to in Regulation 44/2001, instead 
that the behavior of the Latvian authorities. Such a formulation could hide, as already highlighted in the text, the intention of 
the European judges to keep the attention on the problem of compatibility with the Convention of mechanisms for recognition 
and automatic execution.
217  J. fawcett, The impact of article 6 (1) of the ECHR on private international law, in International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 46, 2007, pp. 4ss. A. mayss, A. reeD, European business litigation, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2018.
218  P. beaumont, Abolition of exequatur in Brussels I: Is a public policy defence necessary for the protection of human 
rights, in Praxis des Internationalen privat und Verfahrensrecht-IRPax, 30 (2), 2010, pp. 105ss. X.E. kramer, Abolition of 
exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: Effecting and protecting rights in the European judicial area, in Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review, 4, 2011, pp. 972ss. F. marchaDier, La suppression de l’exequatur affaiblit-elle la protection des droits 
fondamentaux dans l’espace judiciaire europèen?, in Journal Europèenne des Droit de l’Homme, 26 (2), 2014, pp. 348ss. P. 
schLosser, The abolition of exequatur proceedings. Including public policy review, in Praxis des Internationalen privat und 
Verfahrensrecht-IRPax, 30 (2), 2010, 2010, pp. 102ss. L.J. timmer, Abolition of exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: 
Conceived and premature?, in Journal of Private International Law, 9 (1), 2013, pp. 129ss.
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122. It seems that these needs can play a role in the identification of the necessary application 
rules, defined by Regulation n. 593/2008 with a formula that is otherwise applicable to the field of 
application of other regulations, such as “provisions which considered crucial by a country to safeguard 
its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, to all situations falling within 
their scope, whatever the law applicable to the contract should be (...)”219. In setting out in detail which 
provisions may fall within this framework, the assessment of the aspects relating to the protection of 
fundamental rights may be significant. In the category of necessary application rules, the protective rules 
of the subjective positions of single individuals must be considered whenever the interests attached to 
them also have a significant public relevance220.
123. Likewise in CJEU jurisprudence, the need arose to recall the rules on the protection of fun-
damental rights to interpret the extremely broad concept of “superior interest of the minor”, relevant for 
the functioning of multiple names contained in Regulation n. 2201/2003221; on this point, even though 
it is necessary to assess the concrete scope of this concept on a case-by-case basis, it has been clearly 
stated that the consideration of child’s best interests is aimed at ensuring respect for the fundamental 
rights of the child of this requirement222.
X. Impact of CFREU on the identification of jurisdiction titles and connection criteria
124. A further profile of potential impact of CFREU rules on the functioning of civil judicial 
cooperation system concerns the jurisdictional rights and linking criteria, which, as is the case, can come 
to collide on the basis of their formulation with the rules laid down the protection of fundamental rights. 
It is clear that in the context of civilian judicial cooperation in the EU such a conflict arises between 
the rules of secondary law which establish jurisdiction titles or linking criteria and rules of CFREU, the 
former should be considered invalid. A similar risk must be avoided, as far as possible, by means of a 
logical-systematic interpretation, which therefore necessarily also involves the jurisdiction titles or the 
connection criteria. Moreover, the same requirement also arises for the national rules that must be used 
in relation to the implementation of the rules on jurisdiction or the rules of conflict of the union.
125. Compared to this problem, CFREU rules relating to the principle of non-discrimination 
seem to be particularly relevant, since the choice of a given jurisdiction or of a connecting factor could 
be discriminatory, if based on an element that is directly or indirectly linked one of the prohibitions set 
out in articles 21 and 23 of CFREU itself223.
126. In this perspective, it is first of all considered the possible impact of the criterion of citi-
zenship that traditionally (although less frequently) constitutes a factor used, even in combination with 
219  From the CJEU see: C-54/16, Vinyls Italia of 2 march 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:164; C-557/13, Lutz of 16 April 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:227, above cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases. For further details and analysis 
see: J. meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
220  Think about the rules for consumer protection or for the protection of personal data. On these last ones in particular the 
recital n. 2 of the preamble of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88, as well as the free circulation 
of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC according to which the Regulation itself “(...) is intended to contribute to the 
creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and economic union, to economic and social progress, to the strengthening 
and convergence of economies in the internal market and to the well-being of natural persons (...)”. see also from the CJEU 
the case: C-496/17, Deutsche Post of 16 January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:26, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
221  See the aforementioned articles 12 and 25 regarding jurisdiction also the art. 23, par. 1, lett. a) according to which in 
relation to decisions on parental responsibility, compatibility with public policy must be assessed “taking into account the 
best interests of the child”.
222  CJEU C-428/15, D. (Child and Family Agency) of 27 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:819, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases, par. 44.
223  J. meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
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others, for the determination of jurisdiction or for the designation of the applicable law. Article 21, par. 
CFREU has incorporated the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, already provided 
by the treaty as a rule, with provisions to be considered corresponding to art. 18 CFREU as also shown 
in explanations. On the basis of these provisions the use of the criterion of citizenship in the field of 
private international and of procedural law must be carefully assessed.
127. It may also be noted that where the purposes of determining jurisdiction or designation of 
the applicable law, the common citizenship of the parties, as is normally the case in Union’s regulations224, 
cannot be invoked as in the case of citizenship also of only one of the parties. The latter it constitutes one 
of several elements on whose combination the judge must base his jurisdiction225 or the identification of the 
applicable law. This applies in particular where the parties have chosen as competent forum that of the state 
of which one is a citizen226 or the national law of one of them227, since the negotiating element underlying 
the electio fori or the electio iuris excludes the possibility of discrimination. For the same reason, and in 
view of the particular position of the deceased, it does not seem that difficulties may arise with respect to 
the professio iuris of the person whose inheritance is ruled, although it may also concern the law of a state, 
of which that person possesses the citizenship without preserving significant links with it.
128. On the contrary, where the citizenship of a buttonhole of the parties constitutes the only 
element taken into consideration, the rule could be incompatible with the aforementioned prohibition 
of discrimination. Although the union’s regulations show a clear reluctance for such a solution228, this 
solution could still occur on the basis of the national jurisdiction rules referred to in the residual title by 
art. 7 and 14 of Regulation n. 2201/2003.
129. The principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality may impose specific constra-
ints in the event of zero citizenship of the parties or one of them. This can be excluded when the question 
of multiple citizenship is resolved directly by Union act. In particular with regard to jurisdiction over 
matrimonial matters, but with a solution likely to have general scope, CJEU considered without referring 
to the principle of non-discrimination, that the presence of more common citizenship allows the parties 
to use each of them for found the jurisdiction of one of the member states of which they are citizens229.
130. In the event of a choice of law, there is no reason to limit this faculty of the parties to only 
one of the multiple nationalities of which they or one of them are provided230, since the circumstance that 
in such a case a national law is recalled by the will of the elide parties. Where, on the contrary, a single 
224  See for example on the subject of jurisdiction the art. 3, lett. b) of Regulation n. 2201/2003, the art. 6 of Regulation n. 
4/2009, articles 5, lett. b) and 6, lett. d) of the 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 regulations. In terms of applicable law, the art. 4, par. 4 of 
the Hague 2007 protocol. 8, lett. c) of Regulation n. 1259/2010. Article. 26, par. 1 lett. b) of the 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 regula-
tions. See also: P. stone, Stone on private international law in the European Union, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2018.
225  For the purposes of jurisdiction concerning matrimonial matters, art. 3, lett. a) last indent of Regulation no. 2201/2003, 
however, can not be invoked by persons other than spouses from the CJEU the case C-294/15, Mikoŀajczyk of 13 October 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:772, not published, for the purposes of the extension of competence in matters of parental responsibility , the 
art. 12, par. 3, lett. a) of the same Regulation for the purpose of transferring to a judge more suited to dealing with the case, the 
art. 15, par. 3, lett. c) of the same Regulation. In the sense that the citizenship of a party can be compared to the forum necessi-
tatis see the 16th recital of Regulation n. 4/2009.
226  The electio fori in favor of the national state of one of the parties is admitted by the art. 4, lett. b) of Regulation n. 4/2009 
and from the art. 6 of the regulations n. 2016/1103 and 2016/1104. G. cuniberti, S. migLiorini, The European account preser-
vation order Regulation. A commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 265ss.
227  This is for example allowed by art. 5, lett. c) of Regulation no. 1259/2010 and art. 22, lett. b) of the 2016/1103 and 
2016/1104 regulations.
228  See the art. 3, letters c) and d) of Regulation no. 4/2009 which exclude the concentration of the action in the matter 
of maintenance obligations with that in the matter of the status of the persons or of the responsibility of the authorities if the 
jurisdiction on the second is based only on the citizenship of one of the parties.
229  CJEU, C-168/08, Hadadi of 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:474, I-06871.
230  P. hammJe, Le nouveau règlement (UE) n. 1259/2010 du Conseil du 20 December 2010 mettant en oeuvre une coopèra-
tion renforcèe dans le domaine de la loi applicable au divorce et à la sèparation de corps, in Revue Critique de Droit Interna-
tional Privè, 100 (2), 2011, pp. 318ss.
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national law must be identified on the basis of objective criteria, in the absence of a uniform solution 
(such as the one now prefigured by article 26, par. 2 of Regulation no. 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 which 
excludes the resorting to the criterion of connecting common citizenship if spouses or partners have 
more than one), it will resort to the internal law of individual member states231, with respect to which the 
prohibition of discrimination will therefore be emphasized.
131. Nationality is not the only parameter against which discrimination can be considered prohi-
bited. It must first of all take into account the need to exclude any discrimination based on sex prohibited 
by articles 21 and 23 CFREU232. A title of jurisdiction or a liaison criterion which privileges one of the 
parties by reason of the genre cannot be regarded as admissible in any way, as in the past for reference 
to the national law of the husband or father in the legal systems of member states. Although no forecasts 
of such a break are found, in the state, in the Union law, the principle nevertheless requires particular 
caution in the interpretation of jurisdictional rights or connection criteria based on the habitual residence 
of the minor, when it is derived from that of the mother233 excluding any automatism on the point.
132. The relevance of this principle and more generally of that of equal treatment envisaged by 
art. 20 CFREU of which it is an expression, may also emerge with reference to the jurisdiction and the 
connection criteria based on the will of the parties, since for the purposes of the validity of the electio 
fori or the electio iuris, it is necessary to ascertain that there is an agreement that is not based on a signi-
ficant disparity between the parties.
133. This need reveals many indications in the regulations pursuant to art. 81 TFEU234. In some 
cases the choice of competent court (or of the applicable law) is completely and expressly excluded, as 
happens with regard to maintenance obligations in favor of a minor pursuant to art. 4, par. 3, of Regula-
tion n. 4/2009 and of art. 8, par. 3 of the Hague Protocol of 2007235. Limitations affecting the freedom of 
choice of the parties must also be ascribed to the same need, since they are aimed at guaranteeing the pro-
tection of a weaker party. Despite the lack of precise limitations to the freedom of choice from the point 
of view, the need to guarantee the equality of the parties in relation to the choice of law also emerges in 
Regulation no. 1259/2010 because its preamble clearly emphasizes, precisely in view of the risks inherent 
in a potential disparity between spouses, on the so-called “informed choice” principle236, without however 
indicating in detail the practical ways of implementing this principle, with the invalidity of a choice of law 
also made by a spouse with detailed information on its consequences is expressly stated.
134. A last possible tension profile with the principle of non-discrimination concerns the rules 
on conflict of laws concerning the recall of multiple legislations, in particular where these are structured 
on a personal basis and use potentially discriminatory criteria to determine the application of a distinct 
material right on a religious or ethnic basis. In this regard, EU regulations while recalling the need to 
take into account the prohibitions of discrimination pursuant to art. 21 CFREU limit themselves to refe-
rring to rules in force in the legal system of the third State in question237, thus permitting the application 
231  In this sense, the 22 recital of Regulation n. 1259/2010 which makes clear “the full respect of the general principles of 
European Union law”, including, obviously, those obtainable from CFREU.
232  J. meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
233  CJEU, C-497/10 PPU, Mercredi of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:829, I-14309, par. 55.
234  M. poiares maDuro, M. winD, The transformation of Europe: Twenty-five years on, op. cit.,
235  This last provision is also applicable to “an adult who, due to an alteration or insufficiency of personal faculties, is not 
able to take care of his interests (...)”.
236  See recital n. 18 of the Regulation: “the informed choice of both spouses is an essential principle of this Regulation. 
Each spouse should know exactly what the legal and social consequences of the choice of applicable law are: the possibility 
to choose by mutual agreement the applicable law should without prejudice to the rights and equal opportunities of the two 
spouses, to this end the judges in the participating Member States should be aware of the importance of an informed choice for 
both spouses regarding the legal consequences of the agreement reached (...)”.
237  In this sense see in particular: art. 15 of the Regulation n. 1259/2010, art. 37 of Regulation n. 650/2012, the art. 34 of 
Regulation n. 2016/1103 and 2016/1104, art. 17 of Protocol of Hague of 2007. See also from the CJEU, C-404/14, Matoukovà 
of 6 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:653, published in the electronic Reports of the cases.
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of potentially discriminatory criteria. Such a choice does not appear in itself contrary to the principles 
expressed by CFREU, whose art. 22 moreover guarantees respect for cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity238, it being understood that in the presence of a sufficiently qualified violation of the prohibition 
of discrimination, public order clause may be invoked as a limit to the application of foreign law or as 
a cause impeding the recognition of the decision issued on the basis of a law referred to by applying 
criteria contrary to the aforesaid prohibition.
XI. Concluding remarks
135. While the conventional system can only offer protection for equivalent-together with any 
enforcement, judicial or legislative enforcement effects, which the individual Member States deem to 
attribute to the ECtHR ruling-the exercise of the Union’s powers in point protection of fundamental 
rights-with the consequent provision of minimum standards of guarantee-is able to offer, by means of 
those mechanisms such as the direct effect and the non-application of the incompatible national rule, a 
specific form of protection. Protection, the latter, which implies a higher standard of protection, even 
only for the mere application of the principle of primacy.
136. In my opinion, therefore, given that the two different guarantee schemes have contained-
and offer protection- which is not perfectly comparable, the proper fulfillment of the obligations set out 
in articles 2 and 6 TEU could not be disregarded, where the Union enjoys its own competence, from 
the adoption of common minimum standards to safeguard fundamental rights on the sole basis that 
the same rights are also protected by the ECHR. This is because, by exercising the Union’s regulatory 
competence, better and more effective protection could be guaranteed to them. This is especially true 
in connection with the construction of a system of free circulation of foreign judgments based on the 
principle of trust and mutual recognition, respect for fundamental rights can not be presumed by the fact 
that all Member States are also part of the ECHR. Indeed, in this case the question assumes the same 
tautological character as a presumption of respect for fundamental rights based solely on participation 
in the Union, in accordance with article 2 TEU239.
137. In particular, the balancing act between the right to effective judicial protection and other 
opposing interests-which, as we have seen, presupposes a rich series of political evaluations-should be 
placed primarily on a legislative level. Only later, if the assessment of the European legislator is flawed 
by unreasonableness, or is disproportionate, the question could pass to the examination of the judicial 
power. However, legislation which is “systematic” and not strictly sectoral in the matter of fundamental 
procedural rights would constitute a useful benchmark for the CJEU in those cases in which it must ba-
lance their protection in the specific case-that is to assess the compatibility of a legislative act with the 
same-attenuating the “political” character of these decisions and calming any criticism in relation to the 
excessive “activism” of the courts of Luxembourg.
138. The legislative action on harmonization and procedural approximation did not follow that 
transition between economic Europe and the Europe of rights that the Treaty of Lisbon wanted to give 
to every aspect of the Union, but rather remained firmly anchored to that functional link between the 
procedural impact and the functioning of the internal market which has characterized the early stages. 
And indeed, there is a marked gap between the declarations of intent of the European institutions on the 
238  L. gannagè, Les mèthodes du droit international privè à l’èpreuve du conflit de cultures, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2013, 
pp. 22ss.
239  M. wierzbowski, A. gubrynowicz, International investment law for the 21st century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015. A.H. türk, Judicial review in European Union law, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2010. L. wooDs, P. watson, 
Steiner & Woods European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 37ss. C. barnarD, S. peers, European Union 
law, op. cit., pp. 788ss.
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protection of fundamental rights in the EU Justice Agenda for 2020240-and the effective action of the 
Union in this area.
139. If one were to identify one of the most needy aspects of development and evolution within 
the harmonization work, this is certainly relative to the protection of fundamental rights in civil procee-
dings. Action in this sense appears to be extremely urgent, as also highlighted by the recent resolution of 
the European Parliament of 25 October 2016 concerning the establishment of a safeguard mechanism at 
the level of the Union of fundamental rights241. And this not only to guarantee individuals a better level 
of protection for their rights, especially in connection with the free circulation of foreign measures-does 
not detract from the latter.
140. Furthermore, it would be necessary to reconcile the pursuit of the “justice” component of 
the Freedom and Security Security Area-intended as a better realization of the right to effective judicial 
protection, with a consequent greater effectiveness of EU law and completion, correct or better functio-
ning of the internal market-with a concrete and not presumed realization of the “freedom” component, to 
be understood as the right of individuals to act and live in an area of legality, within which fundamental 
rights are fully and concretely guaranteed.
141. Unfortunately, in the field of civil matters the legislator does not seem to have made use 
of the possibilities offered by the new approach of the Lisbon Treaty242, especially as regards the cross-
border judicial cooperation sector, where the immanent requirement for the functioning of the market 
the interior has been dequalified from a necessary to merely preferential element. Once this requirement 
had been removed, it would have been relatively simple to justify a cross-cutting procedural harmoniza-
tion action, aimed at defining a series of common rules to protect fundamental procedural rights, albeit 
limited to cross-border disputes.
142. The possibility of interpreting article 114 TFEU, individually or jointly with article 81 
TFEU243, should not be excluded a priori, as the legitimacy of the adoption of a directive aimed at defi-
ning a set of minimum standards or common principles in civil procedural in order to facilitate the free 
circulation of judgments through the strengthening of mutual trust between the judicial systems of the 
Member States-and thereby facilitate the functioning and complete establishment of the common mar-
ket. Furthermore, a possible recourse to the instrument of enhanced cooperation should not be excluded.
240  COM(2014)-144, The EU Justice Agenda for 2020: strengthening trust, mobility and growth in the Union, Brussels 11 
March 2014.
241  Only the harmonization and approximation of national laws by means of common provisions which, inter alia, ensure 
respect for fundamental procedural and non-procedural rights could allow the concrete removal of the necessary scrutiny by 
the national court of the execution , and consequently the reasons for refusal, without necessarily sacrificing the prerogatives 
of individuals. It is true that, at a precise and timely reading of the Povse and Bosphorus rulings, a presumption of absolute 
equivalent protection, and consequently the realization of a full European full faith and credit clause, would always be incom-
patible with compliance with the Convention. However, it is also clear from the rulings of the European Court that the element 
of primary importance is that of guaranteeing concrete protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention. The 
presence of a normative corpus of EU law capable of infusing and realizing within the legal systems of the Member States a 
minimum, common and uniform standard for the protection of fundamental procedural rights-also modeled taking due account 
of the decisions of the Courts of Strasbourg and Luxembourg-would greatly reduce both the possibility of a conflict between 
the legal systems of the Union and the individual Member States with the provisions of the Convention, and possible conflicts 
between the jurisprudence of the two Courts. Furthermore, one would thus reconcile the pursuit of the “justice” component of 
the SLSG.-understood as a better realization of the right to effective judicial protection, with consequent greater effectiveness 
of EU law and completion, correct or better functioning of the internal market-with a concrete realization, and not presumed, of 
the “freedom” component, to be understood as the right of individuals to act and live in an area of legality, within which funda-
mental rights are fully and concretely guaranteed. Such a course of action was undertaken, for example, in relation to criminal 
law, starting with the Council resolution of 30 November 2009, which established a roadmap for strengthening.
242  The reason for such a difference in treatment could be raised. Even in this case, the most likely appears the ontological 
difference between the “very personal” values at stake in the criminal sphere-among which, of course, personal freedom stands 
out-and those that can be traced back to civil matters. Nevertheless, such a reasoning does not fully satisfy. Indeed, within civil 
matters are not only rights from exclusively economic but also social nature, such as that of family life.
243  L. wooDs, P. watson, Steiner & Woods European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 37ss.
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143. Likewise, a more structured approximation action could, in part, already be done by means 
of the optional instruments, in the area of cross-border disputes. This also by setting up genuine special 
courts244 of the Union competent to resolve-following their procedural rules-disputes in cross-border 
civil and commercial matters, or in areas where the Union’s harmonization action is already substantial, 
such as consumer protection, copyright, industrial patents245, public procurement, competition246. That 
is, in the event that the necessary political agreement could not be reached, defining special procedures 
applicable to such disputes, while maintaining them in the executive State of the individual national 
judicial authorities. In this case, the competence could easily be inferred both directly pursuant to art. 
81 TFEU (for cross-border disputes) that indirectly pursuant to art. 114 and 115 TFEU (for further 
subjects)247. The proposal made by the European Parliament in the aforementioned declaration of 25 
October 2016 to make article 2 TEU and CFREU itself a valid legal for the adoption of legislative mea-
sures to protect fundamental rights248.
144. Of such problems, especially at the point of possible inequality of treatment between in-
ternal and cross-border actions, it seems to take note to widen the notion of “transnational controversy” 
as far as possible, including cases where-although the parties are domiciled in the same Member State 
of the court seised-the place of performance of the contract, in which the harmful event occurs or the 
enforcement of the judicial decision is situated in a different Member State, or the matter at issue falls 
within the scope of Union law.
145. However, this solution, although appreciable, does not convince in terms of practical feasi-
bility. Indeed, it has already been pointed out that the Member States are inclined towards a strict inter-
pretation of the requirement of cross-border implications referred to in article 81 TFEU, the latter recently 
reconfirmed with the approval of Regulation 2015/2421249-of modification of the European procedure for 
small claims and the order for payment procedure-in which the Commission’s proposal to widen the scope 
of the aforementioned proceedings was rejected through an almost similar extensive interpretation of the 
concept of a dispute border. Excluding exceptional revisions of the positions of the Council-possibly also 
following the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union-the scope of application of the draft of Directive 
therefore runs the risk of being brought back into the narrowest riverbed as per regulations 1896/2006250 
and 861/2007251 and 861/20072. Moreover, particular perplexity arises from the extensive clause aimed at 
considering cross-border any dispute that falls within the scope of Union law, if only because of the con-
siderable difficulties in application and interpretation that it entails, which are configured as neither more 
nor less difficult with respect to those relating to the scope of the restrictive clause in article 51 CFREU252.
244  It must not be forgotten, in fact, that the dispute before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance is governed 
by its own procedural regulations. However, the recent decline, by Regulation (EU) no. 2015/2422 of 16 December 2015, of 
the only specialized court pursuant to art. 257 T.F.U.E. seems to exclude the will to proceed towards the creation of a series of 
ad hoc European judges.
245  On the model, for example, the Unified Patent Court, which owns a very detailed procedural regulation, which regulates 
in detail every aspect of the process before it, including any extremely important accessory aspects for effective access to jus-
tice, such as legal aid and exemption from court fees.
246  B. hess, Harmonized Rules and Minimum Standards in the European Law of Civil Procedure, P.E. 556.971, (Study of 
European Parliament, 2016), pp. 13ss.
247  A. kaczorowska-ireLanD, European Union Law, Routledge, London & New York, 2016. F. martucci, Droit de l’Union 
europèenne, op. cit.,
248  A. kaczorowska-ireLanD, European Union Law, op. cit.
249  CJEU, C-627/11, ZSE Energia of 22 November 2018; ECLI:EU:C:2018:941, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases.
250  As we can see form the next cases from the CJEU: C- 21/17, Catlin Europe SE of 6 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:675; 
C-245/14, Thomas Cook Belgium of 22 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:715, all of them published in the electronic Reports of 
the cases. See also for the last case: S. peers, European Union justice and home affairs law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2016, pp. 380ss.
251  See from the CJEU: C-516/18, Sun Express Deutschland of 22 August 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:730, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases.; C-422/18 PPU, FR of 27 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:784, not yet published.
252  C. picheraL, Le droit à un procès èquitable au sens du droit de l’Union europèenne, ed. Anthemis/Nemesis/Limal, Bruxelles, 
2012. M. siLveira, A. canotiLho, Carta dos direitos fundamentais da Uniāo Europeia, ed. Almedina, Coimbra, 2013, pp. 537ss.
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146. It would have been perhaps politically simpler-in order to guarantee a generalized scope 
of application to the provision-to try to promote an extensive interpretation of article 114 TFEU capa-
ble of legitimizing a minimum harmonization intervention in terms of protection of rights fundamental 
procedural law in the whole civil and commercial matter, rather than a notion of a dispute with cross-
border implications so broad that it essentially clears article 81 TFEU253-which already provides for the 
possibility to intervene directly on the procedural arrangements of the Member States, albeit limitedly, 
in fact, to the transnational dispute-from every one of its borders. The latter option, which will hardly be 
accepted by the Member States willingly, if not for the implications present, but to avoid the creation of 
a precedent that could be inconvenient in the future254.
147. In conclusion, the slowness of the Institutions in profiting the openings of the Lisbon 
Treaty, also with the aim of guaranteeing better protection of fundamental procedural rights, is partly 
disheartening, but probably also a child of the delicate moment of turbulence-or open crisis-that Union 
has lived in these last years. The harmonization of national procedural systems-now becoming a neces-
sary element for a further development of the free circulation of foreign judgments and provisions (and 
therefore for the completion of the common market)-could ultimately benefit from the strong political 
will that is usually formed in relation to issues related to the functioning of the internal market, to rein-
force the protection of fundamental procedural rights and reduce differences in judicial treatment in the 
different Member States. In this way, that balancing operation would take place between the different 
components that for too long has been postponed in favor of “security”, or “justice”255, to the partial 
detriment of strengthening the protection of the fundamental rights of European citizens.
253  A. hartkamp, C. siburgh, W. Devroe, Cases, materials and text on European Union law and private law, Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017, pp. 282ss.
254  Therefore, it is not mere coordination arrangements between the different courts, or obligations of mutual recognition in 
relation to notifications made in a different Member State with respect to that of the course seised.
255  A. hartkamp, C. siburgh, W. Devroe, Cases, materials and text on European Union law and private law, op. cit.
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